|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|103366||2018||15 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||12464 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Transport Policy, Volume 64, May 2018, Pages 61-75
We study the relative efficiency of two mechanisms actually employed in large-scale public procurements, often for transportation projects such as roads, bridges and rapid transit systems. In the more common âbidding the projectâ mechanism, the government specifies the size of the project (a quantity) and firms bid prices (the lowest bid winning). In the âbidding the envelopeâ mechanism the government specifies what it is willing to spend and firms bid quantities (the highest winning). With uncertainty about project costs and benefits, the much less frequently applied âbidding the envelopeâ mechanism can lead to higher value for money. Its advantage lies in its ability to allow quantity to adjust to high or low costs.