|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|104029||2017||31 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||13337 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of Financial Intermediation, Volume 32, October 2017, Pages 88-99
We provide a tractable model of counterparty risk in a risk transfer market, and analyze the consequences of this risk being private information. We show that unknown type information can be revealed in the presence of a large trader identification policy; however, the market allocation is shown to be constrained inefficient. The inefficiency is highlighted by considering the imposition of a transaction tax, which can improve welfare by encouraging more information revelation and increasing risk transfer. The results suggest that increased transparency and/or central counterparty arrangements in over-the-counter derivative markets may promote transparency of counterparty risk.