ناکارآمدی در سیستم سهمیه بندی شیر انگلستان
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|10520||2000||16 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Food Policy, Volume 25, Issue 1, February 2000, Pages 1–16
Given that the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European Union has imposed milk marketing quota on producers, the fact that they are tradeable in the UK increases economic efficiency. Nevertheless, significant inefficiencies remain. Modelling work reported here suggests that significantly more quota needed to be transferred from less to more efficient producers in 1996/97 for industry efficiency to be maximised, and that a large number of vulnerable inefficient producers remained in milk production. It is also shown that, despite tradeable quotas, a significant number of dairy farmers still achieve a poor match between available quota and production. It is argued that the rules on quota trading could be changed to increase efficiency. Finally, it is argued that UK milk producers are incurring costs for acquiring quota which add at least 12.5% to production costs: a high price to pay for the market stability which quotas have brought.
In a market such as that for milk quota in the UK, inefficiencies can arise (1) from constraints imposed on the operation of the market, and (2) from the inability of milk producers to use the market to its full potential. This paper explores both of these sources of inefficiency, and argues that the inefficiency of producers in using the market exceeds that due to restrictions arising from the rules governing the transfer of quota. It may be argued that another major source of inefficiency has arisen. This is due to the extension of the life of milk quota beyond the life expected when the quota regime was imposed on European Union dairy farmers in 1984. The implications of the emergence of non-producing quota holders (NPQHS)1 as a long-lived class of rentiers in the UK, Germany (the, so-called, “sofa farmers”), and some other member states can be assumed to have been unanticipated. The paper begins by rehearsing the static theory of the tradeable quotas. It then presents arguments to the effect that UK dairy farmers have not achieved the optimally efficient outcome which the theoretical model indicates might be achieved where milk quota is tradeable. It then considers the implications which quota trading rules have for efficiency. Finally it considers the additional costs incurred by active milk producers in the UK as a result of the milk quota system, an issue which embraces the “problem” of the NPQHs.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
Where marketing quotas are imposed it is economically efficient that they be tradeable. Nevertheless, it is argued from the preceding analysis in the case of UK milk quotas, that there are lags in adjustment and imperfections such that, the theoretical optimum has not been achieved. To reach the theoretical optimum, it appears that a substantial further redistribution of quota would be needed to eliminate apparent economic inefficiency. It is estimated that in 1996/97 a further 15.8 or 26% (depending on the scenario) of national quota would need to have been transferred for all inefficiency to have been eliminated. It is also apparent that the cost, imposed by the quota market on those wishing to expand milk production, is substantial. For 1997/98, it is estimated that active UK milk producers may have incurred costs equivalent to as much 12.5% of total milk revenue in order to acquire the additional quota they felt they needed. In some cases, the price of acquisition meant that producers received marginal returns insufficient to cover total medium-term costs, although it may be assumed that in the vast majority of cases a margin over short-run variable costs was made. There is evidence that, despite a considerable learning period from 1984 to 1997, a significant number of producers in 1996/97 were still not managing their quota and production with maximal efficiency. The number of those over or under-producing their quota was surprisingly high. This, combined with the high costs imposed by the milk quota regime on expanding and potential new producers, provides substantial grounds for arguing that abolition of quota entails substantial benefits (as well as uncertain risks) for the UK milk producing sector.