دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی شماره 107786
کد مقاله سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی ترجمه فارسی تعداد کلمات
107786 2018 36 صفحه PDF سفارش دهید 16836 کلمه
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عنوان انگلیسی
Trade credit contracting under asymmetric credit default risk: Screening, checking or insurance
منبع

Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)

Journal : European Journal of Operational Research, Volume 266, Issue 2, 16 April 2018, Pages 554-568

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پیش نمایش مقاله

چکیده انگلیسی

Trade credit has grown rapidly and become an effective tool to incentivize suppliers to increase sales and profits in supply chain management. However, granting trade credit also increases the suppliers’ default risks, especially when they face retailers privileged with private information concerning their credit status. In this paper, we consider three common mechanisms that suppliers use to address credit default problems: the screening, checking and insurance mechanisms. Under these mechanisms, based on two-level trade credit, we model a supplier–retailer–customers supply chain, in which the retailer’s credit level, either high or low, is the retailer’s private information. We find that the high credit type retailer’s consumption is always limited by reducing the credit period under all three mechanisms. In contrast, for the low credit type retailer, the supplier manages the default risk by directly forgoing some profits from the retailer under the screening mechanism, encouraging the retailer to consume under the checking mechanism, and restricting the retailer’s consumption under the insurance mechanism. Additionally, contrary to intuition, we show that a low credit type retailer consistently obtains a longer credit period from the supplier since the corresponding risk of a longer credit period can be gradually decreased through an increased initial payment due to the regulating effect of trade credit. Finally, our results reveal that the supplier prefers to use the insurance mechanism only when the retailer’s credit state is relatively poor and employs either the screening or checking mechanism based on the default risk gap effect otherwise.

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