اقتصاد هزینه معاملات در جهانی سپارش: بررسی تفاوت های منطقه ای و مفاهیم برای عملکرد
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|11320||2013||12 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : International Journal of Production Economics, Volume 141, Issue 1, January 2013, Pages 243–254
This paper addresses two gaps in current research on transaction cost economics (TCE): first, the fundamental claim suggesting that firms that align their governance structure to transactions according to TCE perform better than those that do not, and second, the application of TCE to global sourcing transactions. A research model is presented and evaluated using a set of 150 relationships between Swiss buyers and foreign suppliers. The findings suggest that there are significant differences in how transactions and governance structures are aligned with varying performance and with suppliers from Western Europe as compared to suppliers from other regions.
Transaction cost economics (TCE) has been an established concept for analyzing economic organizations for several decades. The theory – based on Coase's (1937) work about the nature of the firm and later advanced by Williamson (1975) – is centered around the two notions transaction costs and governance structures. The basic claim is that an appropriate alignment of transactions with the corresponding governance structure will allow an organization to economize on its costs. Originating as a positive theory in economics, the concept has been transferred to the area of business administration, where it is applied as a normative concept to improve decision making of managers (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996 and Masten, 1993). The theory has been tested empirically numerous times and summarized in several meta-studies (David and Han, 2004 and Macher and Richman, 2008). In the majority of cases, existing studies focus on empirical testing of the link between characteristics of transactions – most prominently asset specificity and uncertainty – and governance structure. However, the most intriguing proposition from the normative point of view has received only minor attention up to now. That is the assessment of the economizing effect (David and Han, 2004), or put differently, whether transactions with a proper alignment of transactions to governance structures according to TCE predictions exhibit better performance than others. A recent publication by Williamson (2008) pointed to the need for further elaboration of the link between TCE and Supply Chain Management (SCM). In accordance with commonly accepted interpretations of SCM (SCOR, 2008), Williamson mentioned procurement as one of the major elements in SCM. Procurement is of particular importance in manufacturing, as several tendencies have led to an increased weight of this business function (Degraeve et al., 2000): Concentration on core competencies has decreased the depth of value added in many industries to below 50% (Jahns and Lück, 2005). At the same time, globalization has opened up new markets and possibilities for purchasing professionals, especially in low-cost countries (LCC). Therefore, companies today not only need to purchase more but also have to cope with a more global and heterogeneous environment. Williamson (2008) also recognized this problem: “Suppose, instead of a common boundary, that the exchange in question is between a U.S. firm and a foreign supplier or buyer. Additional complications arise if property rights are less secure and/or courts are less reliable in exchanges across boundaries. Such hazards need to be factored into the transaction cost calculus” (p. 12).
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
In summary, we draw two main conclusions. First, we identified significant differences regarding how high and low performers align transactions with governance structures. Contrary to classic TCE prescriptions, high performers set up governance structures that are over-integrated according to TCE, whereas low performers demonstrate alignments that are in line with transactions. Second, evidence suggests that there are significant differences in how transactions and governance structures are aligned with suppliers from different regions. More precisely, transactions with Western European suppliers are on average over-integrated, whereas transactions with suppliers from other regions become less and less over-integrated with increasing distance from Western Europe. The significant differences of alignment regarding performance and supplier region show that TCE is indeed an insightful theory for studying global sourcing transactions. However, the identified relation between alignment and performance suggests that practical application of TCE as a normative theory in managerial decision making should be considered carefully. Unless the classical model, as utilized in our study, is enriched with amendments that take into consideration more parameters of real-life decision-making in global sourcing, the theory seems inappropriate to guide managers. The rather low effect size of the performance implication further emphasizes that the impact of TCE on performance in the context of global sourcing should not be overestimated. Hence, our proposition to practitioners dealing with sourcing decision is to augment the classic TCE model by integrating further parameters, such as risk preferences, trust propensity, sourcing strategy, or market environment, into its calculus and to combine it with other factors influencing the outcome of procurement arrangements. Regarding the handling of suppliers from different regions, practitioners are encouraged to check carefully whether the present alignments between transactions and governance structures in their supplier relationships are appropriate for the given exchanges or whether they are unintentionally a consequence of the geographic location of the suppliers and the inherent necessities that emerge from those locations.