تاثیر مالکیت خانواده و ساختار سرمایه در عملکرد بهره وری از شرکت های تولیدی کره ای: حکومت شرکت ها و "مشکل chaebol"
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|11845||2006||26 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Volume 20, Issue 2, June 2006, Pages 209–233
This paper examines the relationship between corporate governance and productivity performance, focusing on family ownership and capital structure. Paying particular attention to chaebols, or large business groups with entrenched family control, diversified business structure, and heavy debt-dependence, we find the positive relationship between family ownership concentration and productivity performance to be much stronger in chaebol firms than in non-chaebol firms. Moreover, high debt reliance (or low equity–asset ratio) is shown to be negatively related to productivity performance in non-chaebol firms but positively in chaebol firms. J. Japanese Int. Economies20 (2) (2006) 209–233.
Since the Asian financial crisis of 1997, the issue of corporate governance has become a subject of active policy and academic debate. Many have pointed out the deficiencies in the corporate governance systems plaguing many of the crisis-stricken countries as the root cause of weakened fundamentals and poor economic performance. However, direct evidence on the effects of different governance systems on corporate performance and competitiveness is still sparse. This paper provides empirical evidence on the link between corporate governance and corporate performance.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
This paper has examined the impact of controlling family's block ownership and capital structure on firm-level productivity performance. Using the data on Korean manufacturing firms from 1991 to 1998, we found evidence that family ownership concentration is associated positively with firm-level productivity performance. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that ownership concentration leads not only to greater convergence of interest between the controlling shareholder and other shareholders, but also to greater investment in firm-specific investments (perhaps, such as R & D and human capital investments) that results in a better long-term productivity performance. A significant positive relationship between equity ratio and productivity performance was also found, suggesting that equity governance allows greater flexibility and discretion, leading to greater innovative activities than debt governance.