حفظ تعادل مالکیت محلی با سرمایه گذاری خارجی در جزیره کوچک ماهیگیری
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|12158||2007||15 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Ocean & Coastal Management,, Volume 50, Issue 7, 2007, Pages 523-537
The Falkland Islands Government has established a transferable rights management regime for its fisheries resources. The allocation of transferable rights has to be sensitive to economic and social considerations specific to the Falkland Islands. One critical requirement is the need to balance local ownership and control with the need for direct foreign investment and the continued involvement of foreign fishing fleets in the territory's fisheries. Several mechanisms to achieve this balance are contained in recent fisheries legislation. These mechanisms will be of interest to other small island territories facing similar challenges in their commercial fisheries.
In late 2005, the Falkland Islands Government passed legislation establishing a transferable rights-based management regime for its fisheries resources. The reasons for the introduction of a rights-based system are predominately economic. The growth of the Falkland Islands economy is significantly affected by the capacity of local fishing companies to take advantage of the globalization of the international seafood market. Participating more fully in the global seafood market means expanding the economic base of the seafood sector by diversifying fishing-related activities undertaken by Falklands-based companies. A system of individually transferable rights is intended to energize a transition from an industry involved in the catching of fish for companies based mainly in Europe, to a Falkland's based seafood industry focused on seafood production marketed to a wide range of international markets. A diversified seafood sector also reduces the Falkland Island Government's fiscal risk from reliance on fishing license revenues by ensuring that a greater proportion of private and public sector revenue comes from a range of seafood and related economic activity, for example maritime service industries. The new regime is also designed to encourage the long-term ownership and control of rights to Falkland Islands fisheries resources by Falkland Islander owned and controlled fishing companies. A key issue is how to ensure the long-term local ownership and control of fishing rights without unduly disrupting current successful joint ventures between local companies and foreign fishing companies. Related to this is the need to maintain on going foreign investment in the development of the territorys’ extensive fisheries resources. The Falkland Islands do not have the population base to provide the financial investment necessary to develop fisheries from domestic sources.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
The Falkland Islands rights-based management regime is being progressively implemented. The expectation is that all fisheries will be managed under the new regime by late 2007. Because the system has just been implemented it is too soon to assess the impact of the policy on local control and ownership and on foreign investment. Baseline data for future assessment of the reforms is set out in Table 2. One measure of success will be the change in the number of companies converting their PQ to ITQ meaning they have met the tests of efficient use, effective control, and active involvement. All companies have completed the necessary restructuring to ensure they comply with ownership restrictions on ITQ. What is clear in the early days of the new system is that companies are more confident. Quota owners are looking at options for the future as to how they utilise their CE, including short-term trades of CE or longer-term changes in ITQ. None of this is yet quantifiable but companies are thinking more about fishing plans and how they utilize their CE, rather than simply applying for license time. If the reforms are successful, the Falklands fisheries sector will again become a prime driver of economic growth. First, fishing companies will have increased security of access to the fisheries resources and increased flexibility in the way they decide to structure activities to take advantage of global business opportunities and hence make more profit. Second, diversification should occur in the industry as companies, no longer required to invest in expensive fishing vessels to retain their licenses, look to additional investment in value-added activities such as processing and marketing. Third, seafood companies should invest much more in research and development because long-term rights mean that they will benefit from investments that have longer pay-off periods. Fourth, international competitiveness should increase as poorly performing companies sell rights to better performing companies. Fifth, as the profitability of the domestic seafood sector increases, government income from personal and corporation tax and resource rents will increase offsetting a declining trend in real government income from fisheries. Even if only in part successful, the new rights-based management system provides a model for small coastal states or small industrial fisheries currently dependent on foreign fishing fleets. Rights-based systems promoting local ownership and control have been considered too complex to implement and administer for small territories and states. Following the Falklands model, many states and territories should be able to enjoy inherent advantages of local rights-based management over dependency on foreign investment and the loss of control of fisheries resources to foreign interests.