مالکیت دولتی بانک ها و موسسات و توسعه مالی
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|12486||2008||35 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of Development Economics, Volume 85, Issues 1–2, February 2008, Pages 218–252
Using a suitably modified locational model of banking, we examine the influence of institutions, such as deposit contract enforcement, in explaining the share of government owned banks in the banking system. We present cross-country evidence suggesting that institutional factors are relatively more important determinants of the share of state banks than political or historical ones. We argue that rather than privatizing or subsidizing state banks governments in developing countries should build institutions that foster the development of private banking.
It is now widely accepted that well functioning financial systems can help promote economic growth, especially in middle income countries (Rioja and Valev, 2004 and Demetriades and Andrianova, 2004). However, the policies that could advance financial development remain elusive for many developing countries. Importantly, financial liberalization, widely considered critical in delivering a more efficient and competitive banking system, has frequently been followed by financial instability, especially where institutions such as rule-of-law and regulation were weak (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1999, Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999 and Arestis and Demetriades, 1999). Surprisingly, even though financial liberalization policies have been widely adopted, government ownership of banks remains prevalent in many countries (Barth et al., 2000). Could this stylized fact to some extent explain why financial development has not taken off in some countries, or, indeed why financial liberalization has been followed by financial instability? An important recent paper by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002) suggests that this may indeed be the case. The authors report a number of cross-country correlations that suggest that the degree of government ownership in the banking system is negatively related to subsequent financial development and economic growth, and positively associated with financial instability. If these relationships are causal, as indeed is implied by the authors, then large-scale privatizations of banking systems around the world could generate enormous benefits in terms of both financial development and economic growth.1 However, if the relationships observed in the cross-country data reflect reverse causality or are driven by other factors, then it is essential to know what factors determine the presence of government owned banks and what the likely implications of their privatization might be.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
Some aspects of our theoretical model resemble arguments found in the “developmental” view of state banking (Gerschenkron, 1962). According to this view, state banks could jump start both financial and economic development when economic institutions are inadequate for private banks to play their developmental role. Our paper certainly formalizes some of these arguments and provides evidence that is consistent with them. However, the paper should not be viewed simply as a modern version of the developmental view of state banking for at least two important reasons. Firstly, in our theoretical model we assume that state banks are inherently less efficient than private banks in terms of their lending and investment decisions, once private banking exceeds a minimal threshold level of development; this is, of course, a key element of the political view of state banking. Secondly, while our findings do imply that at very low levels of institutional quality governments could create state banks to jump start financial and economic development, our main policy implication is that governments should build institutions that foster the development of private banking. Specifically, our empirical results suggest that enhancing market regulation and strengthening disclosure rules are particularly effective means of reducing government ownership in banking.43 Our theoretical results suggest that these types of institutions are likely to increase depositors' confidence in private banking institutions, by preventing or curbing any opportunistic tendencies that are likely to be present in transitional or less developed banking systems.