گزارش کارگاه آموزشی - الگوبرداری نتیجه مناقصات رقابتی
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|1315||2010||5 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Research in Transportation Economics, Volume 29, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 6–10
Workshop 1 was concerned to identify the real results of competitive tendering, and experience on how to make it work better, using evidence from the rail and bus sectors in a large number of countries spread around the world. It was found that competitive tendering had generally been successful in terms of quality and costs, but problems had occurred in a number of cases, so careful attention must be paid to the design of tendering exercises, details of the contract, risk-sharing arrangements and the approach to any re-negotiation found to be necessary. As a result, an important conclusion is that the tendering authority needs a high degree of expertise in these issues; any thought that competitive tendering relieves the public authority of the need for expertise in public transport is mistaken.
The main question of Workshop 1 was: How has competitive tendering (CT) performed as a regulatory benchmark over the last two decades? This included quantitative and qualitative comparison of CT with other strategic solutions (direct awarding, negotiating) as well as comparison of different CT tactical and operational methods, according to the following questions: • What are the real results and effects of tendering? • How to make the tendering process work better? • How to improve the contract as a linking pin between the tendering and concession period? • How to design concession management, the main challenge after tendering? 14 papers have been presented, of which 6 dealt with rail and 9 with bus transport. There were participants from as many as 10 countries in Europe (UK, Germany, Sweden, France, Poland, Spain), Asia (Japan, Kazakhstan), Australia, and South America (Brazil), which provided a real world overview.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
The decision on whether to provide transport services by an internal operator or to contract them to an external firm is currently a political matter – especially a question of relationships between governments or local authorities and labour unions. The economic analysis shows that CT can provide high quality and cost efficiency, if it is well designed. Nowadays there is plenty of experience worldwide, verifying which solutions succeeded, and which failed, so it should be possible to identify how to outsource in the optimal way in any given conditions – not learning once more the lessons that others have learnt before. This needs ongoing worldwide detailed research on contracting, including incentive and penalty schemes, avoiding monopolistic behaviour of operators and infrastructure access solutions. Current research suggests that in general, public bodies have a high standard of competency and adequate funding. They should promote competition between operators, by lowering market entry barriers, through public ownership of key infrastructure and railway rolling stock, reasonable risk sharing and relatively long contracts. They should also prevent mergers, when they are a threat to competition, require a high level of performance from operators and not misuse contract renegotiating. They will need to monitor carefully many aspects of operators’ procedures, service quality and passenger satisfaction, as well as manage incentive and penalty schemes, whilst avoiding the risk of over regulation. Especially, the incentive system should be relative simple, and the relationship between quality and operators’ incomes clear. Any thought therefore that contracting out removes the need for a high level of competence in public transport in public authorities is mistaken. Public authorities will need a high level of competence in knowing what data to monitor, how to interpret the results and how to act in the light of those conclusions; how to achieve this is a key question when introducing CT.