|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|132305||2018||10 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||10847 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of Mathematical Economics, Volume 76, May 2018, Pages 52-61
We consider generalized senderâreceiver games in which the sender also has an action to choose, but this action is payoff-relevant only to himself. We study âcooperate and talkâÂ equilibria (CTE) in which, before sending his message, the sender can commit to delegate his decision to the receiver.Â CTE are beneficial to the receiver (with respect to no communication) and unlike the equilibria of the plain cheap talk game, preserve him from afterwards regret.Â While existence of CTE cannot be guaranteed in general, a sufficient condition is that the receiver has a âuniform punishment decisionâÂ against the sender.