اثر سرکوب مالی و اجرای کارآفرینی در توسعه اقتصادی
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|13414||2008||20 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of Monetary Economics, Volume 55, Issue 2, March 2008, Pages 278–297
A general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents (with respect to wealth and ability) shows that differences across countries in intermediation costs and enforcement generate differences in occupational choice, firm size, credit, output and income inequality. Counterfactual experiments are performed for Latin American, European, transition and high growth Asian countries, with empirical estimates of each country's financial frictions and United States values for all other parameters. The results isolate the quantitative effect of these financial frictions in explaining the performance gap between each country and the United States, and depend critically on whether a general equilibrium factor price effect is operative.
Financial repression and contract enforcement vary considerably across countries and with the level of economic development. For example, Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2004) document that the net interest margin, a measure of financial repression which reflects explicit and implicit financial sector taxes and bank regulation, is over 10% in Belarus, Burundi and Ghana, but less than 2% in the Netherlands and Switzerland.1 Similarly, data from The World Bank (2005a) show that the quality of enforcement, reflected in collateral requirements and bankruptcy laws, varies considerably across countries. La Porta et al. (1998) show that institutions that affect enforcement are also correlated with the level of economic development (see Fig. 2). We assess the quantitative effects of these financial frictions on macroeconomic development—output per capita, total credit, income inequality and occupational choice.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
This paper developed a framework to study qualitatively and quantitatively the effects of two financial frictions, intermediation costs and financial contract enforcement, on measures of development: output per capita, total credit, income inequality and entrepreneurship. We used data on intermediation costs and enforcement to map observed cross country differences in financial frictions into the model economy and found that: • Using independent measures of intermediation costs and enforcement, financial frictions can account for part of the differences in international income levels: counterfactual exercises using φφde facto show that financial market imperfections explain almost the whole output per capita gap for some European countries (France, Italy and Greece), and a significant fraction for some Latin American countries (Brazil, Mexico and Argentina) and transition economies (Russia and Poland). • The quantitative implications of financial frictions depend on whether the interest rate is endogenous or exogenous, with the effects on output typically more pronounced when the interest rate is exogenous. An unconstrained corporate sector tends to exacerbate the impact of financial frictions on output, because corporate firms are not necessarily more efficient than some of the constrained entrepreneurs.