|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|137132||2017||14 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||7485 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Theoretical Computer Science, Volume 695, 26 September 2017, Pages 28-41
We consider a strategic game, where players submit jobs to a machine that executes all jobs in a way that minimizes energy while respecting the given deadlines. The energy consumption is then charged to the players in some way. Each player wants to minimize the sum of that charge and of their job's deadline multiplied by a priority weight. Two charging schemes are studied, the proportional cost share which does not always admit pure Nash equilibria, and the marginal cost share, which does always admit pure Nash equilibria, at the price of overcharging by a constant factor.