واکنش گسترش سواپ پیش فرض های اعتباری بازار نوظهور به تغییرات رتبه بندی اعتباری مستقل
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|14075||2010||13 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of Banking & Finance, Volume 34, Issue 12, December 2010, Pages 2861–2873
This paper examines the effect of sovereign credit rating change announcements on the CDS spreads of the event countries, and their spillover effects on other emerging economies’ CDS premiums. We find that positive events have a greater impact on CDS markets in the two-day period surrounding the event, and are more likely to spill over to other emerging countries. Alternatively, CDS markets anticipate negative events, and previous changes in CDS premiums can be used to estimate the probability of a negative credit event. The transmission mechanisms for positive events are the common creditor and competition in trade markets.
The credit derivatives market has attracted significant attention and capital in the last decade, expanding from $180 billion in outstanding notional value in 1996 to approximately $33 trillion by the end of 2008.1 Credit default swaps (CDS’s) are the simplest and the most widely traded credit derivatives, capturing a substantial segment of the market.2 A report issued by the British Bankers’ Association indicates a recent increase in the fraction of the CDS contracts written on high-yield debt instruments, a fact that may be attributed to the expansion of emerging debt markets.3 Emerging sovereigns are among the largest high-yield borrowers in the world. What distinguishes them from other high-yield obligors, however, is that countries in financial distress do not liquidate their assets or enter bankruptcy proceedings, but go through debt restructuring mechanisms in which defaulted bonds are exchanged for new longer maturity, lower yield debt instruments. Given the nature of sovereign default risk, it is important to determine how sovereign CDS markets react to credit rating announcements. Using a daily data set consisting of dollar denominated CDS’s written on high-yield sovereign reference entities, this paper investigates the reaction of CDS spreads to credit rating changes and the cross-border spillover effects of these events. In particular, we seek to address the following questions: 1. Do credit rating announcements contain new information? Is the information content of positive and negative rating changes symmetric? 2. Can changes in CDS spreads be used to estimate the probability of future rating events? Are these changes equally useful in predicting positive and negative credit rating announcements? 3. If credit rating events contain new information, is there a spillover effect on the CDS spreads of other sovereign entities? Are the reactions of other countries’ CDS spreads symmetric in response to positive and negative announcements? Do prior credit rating announcements contribute to the spillover effect? 4. Can economic fundamentals explain the size and the direction of the potential spillovers? In an efficient market, CDS spreads should not change in reaction to credit rating announcements. Assuming that rating agencies rely on publicly available information to form their opinions, CDS spreads must already reflect this information. Therefore, our first hypothesis is: H1. CDS markets are efficient and CDS spreads are not affected by rating announcements. If CDS markets are efficient and rating agencies rationally rely on available information, we expect CDS spreads to narrow (widen) several days prior to a positive (negative) rating announcement. That is, having access to the same public information used by rating agencies, investors can make decisions that would lead to adjustments in CDS spreads prior to a rating announcement. Hence, our second hypothesis is: H2. Credit ratings events are anticipated by CDS markets. Several studies have demonstrated that a significant portion of sovereign CDS spreads is explained by common factors such as investors’ risk appetite and global economic fundamentals (Remolona et al., 2008 and Longstaff et al., 2008). In this case, any rating announcement containing new information should have spillover effects on the CDS spreads of other sovereigns, leading to our third hypothesis: H3. Rating announcements containing new information have spillover effects on the CDS markets of other sovereigns. Additionally, if rating events occur in short successions, the spillover effect of the current event may be affected by the information content of previous rating announcements. Therefore, we hypothesize that: H4. The impact of rating announcements on CDS markets is diminished by prior rating announcements. If a significant portion of sovereign CDS spreads can be explained by common factors (McGuire and Schrijvers, 2003, Remolona et al., 2008 and Ciarlone et al., 2009), spillover effects could occur through the impact of a rating announcement on these factors. Alternatively, the spillover effects could arise if the announcement reveals new information about economic fundamentals. To answer our final question, we explore whether potential spillovers can be explained in terms of specific economic channels such as a common lending center or competition among sovereigns in the area of capital or trade flows. Our findings generally reject the first hypothesis; rating announcements appear to reveal new information that affects CDS spreads. More specifically, premiums display a stronger reaction to positive announcements, but respond weakly to negative events. The latter indicates that the information contained in credit downgrades is already incorporated in CDS spreads by the time the rating announcement is released. Thus, our results support H2, suggesting that investors may be able to use changes in CDS spreads to estimate the probability of a rating event. We find that changes in CDS premiums are particularly useful in estimating the probability of negative events. We also find that while positive events display some spillover effects, negative credit rating announcements have no impact on CDS spreads of other emerging economies. The spillover effect of positive events, however, is only marginally significant and its impact is considerably reduced by prior rating events; therefore, we cannot reject H4. The transmission channels of these spillover effects are the common lending center and competition in trade markets. In the context of the lending center, an increase in the credit quality of a sovereign relieves the capital requirements of its lending center making more capital available to other countries. Increased access to capital reduces the financial constraints of these governments, ultimately leading to lower CDS premiums on their debt. Alternatively, as a country’s credit quality improves, it becomes more attractive to the world markets affecting capital flows to other countries and (eventually) increasing their levels of CDS premiums. The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. A brief discussion regarding sovereign credit ratings and debt defaults follows in Section 3. Section 4 describes the data and provides a preliminary analysis. Section 5 discusses the methodology and summarizes the empirical results. Section 6 concludes.