|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|141768||2018||12 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||10076 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Ecological Economics, Volume 146, April 2018, Pages 347-358
Successfully implemented payment for ecosystem services (PES) programs can provide both conservation of nature and financial support to rural communities. In this paper, we explore how PES programs can be designed so as to maximize the amount of additional ecosystem services provided for a given budget. We also provide a brief summary of the use of auction mechanisms in real world PES programs. To explore the potential additionality of different PES program designs we use a conceptual agent based simulation model where payments are either fixed, or set through a uniform or discriminatory auction. The program can also be designed to target payments to land-owners based on their provision of ecosystem services. Theoretically, auctions should be the most effective design, especially if payments are differentiated and targeted by ecosystem service provision. However, what we find is that the context in which the PES program is implementedâbaseline compliance with program standards among the participants, correlation between opportunity costs and ecosystem services in the landscape, heterogeneity in costs and budget sizeâhas a determining impact on the relative effectiveness of the different payment designs, with fixed payments schemes being much more effective than auctions in certain settings. Our findings suggest that context should be taken into serious consideration when a PES program design is chosen.