زمان بهینه برای غرامت مدیر عامل شرکت
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||تعداد صفحات مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی|
|142025||2018||5 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Finance Research Letters, Volume 24, March 2018, Pages 90-94
We extend a standard principal-agent model of CEO compensation by modeling the progressive attenuation of information asymmetries about firm value by shareholders in continuous time. The dynamics of the stock price process are affected by the continuous accumulation of exogenous shocks, and by the progressive resolution of information asymmetries. The optimal timing of compensation is the point in time at which the stock price is most informative about the managerâs action. When exogenous shocks accumulate at a constant rate over time and information asymmetries are resolved at a decreasing rate, the optimal timing of compensation is the point in time at which these two rates coincide.