دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی شماره 14287
عنوان فارسی مقاله

تولید و پرداخت های مدیریتی: MVA و EVA به عنوان عوامل تعیین کننده غرامت اجرائی

کد مقاله سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی ترجمه فارسی تعداد کلمات
14287 2003 21 صفحه PDF سفارش دهید محاسبه نشده
خرید مقاله
پس از پرداخت، فوراً می توانید مقاله را دانلود فرمایید.
عنوان انگلیسی
Wealth creation and managerial pay: MVA and EVA as determinants of executive compensation
منبع

Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)

Journal : Global Finance Journal, Volume 14, Issue 2, July 2003, Pages 159–179

کلمات کلیدی
- غرامت اجرائی - پرداخت برای عملکرد - ارزش افزوده اقتصادی - ارزش افزوده بازار -
پیش نمایش مقاله
پیش نمایش مقاله تولید و پرداخت های مدیریتی: MVA و EVA به عنوان عوامل تعیین کننده غرامت اجرائی

چکیده انگلیسی

Designing effective compensation contracts has become increasingly complex due to the globalization of the executive work force and the multitude of incentive schemes. We examine the relationships between managerial pay and firm performance among domestic and global firms using economic value added (EVA) and market value added (MVA) to assess wealth creation. Our work suggests that top managers in domestic- and globally focused firms are not only incented to increase EVA, but also rewarded for past additions to MVA. The results of our research suggest that managers of highly globalized firms tend to be paid at higher levels, reflecting the increased complexity of managing global firms.

مقدمه انگلیسی

Previous studies have proposed that optimal executive compensation contracts perfectly align the interests of the executives with those of the firm's shareholders Grossman & Hart, 1983 and Harris & Raviv, 1979. In theory, such contracts act as incentive mechanisms for executives to engage in behaviors that maximize the firm's value and reward executives for such behavior Fama, 1980 and Jensen & Meckling, 1976. Whether executive compensation contracts meet this test of optimality, ex ante or ex post, is an empirical question subject to ongoing investigation (Tosi, Werner, Katz, & Gomez-Mejia, 2000).

نتیجه گیری انگلیسی

We investigate the relationship between executive compensation and firm performance using cross-sectional regression analysis. The dependent variables in all our cross-sectional regressions are the three components of compensation (salary, bonus and TDC) adjusted for firm size. For brevity, we refer to compensation components generically as COMP. In all regressions, the t statistics are based on White's (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent estimators of the standard errors of the model's parameters.

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