یک روش هزینه معامله به یک تناقض در بازاریابی بین المللی
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|14540||2005||16 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||6460 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Scandinavian Journal of Management, Volume 21, Issue 1, March 2005, Pages 61–76
ویژگی بین المللی به عنوان در بازاریابی بین المللی منعکس شده
اقتصاد هزینه معاملات و دیدگاه مبتنی بر منابع
صنعت ماهی آزاد پرورشی
Why do firms that make specific downstream investments as they start international operations, sometimes turn to more market-like arrangements as they gain international experience and their international sales increase? This paradox in international marketing is the key question to be addressed in this article. We use the concept of dynamic or temporary governance costs to examine the paradox. The pattern of internationalization in the Norwegian farmed salmon industry provides an example whereby Norwegian exporters established their own sales offices in several international markets in the early stages of internationalization, but subsequently disintegrated vertically and came to rely on more market-like arrangements. An analysis of the internationalization of this industry suggests that, over time, the market provided better capabilities than vertical integration. This reduced the transaction costs, thus making vertical disintegration an efficient strategy.
This article addresses an apparent paradox in international marketing. In some industries, firms making downstream specific investments when they start their international operations often turn to more market-like arrangements as their presence in international markets becomes stronger and their international sales increase. One example of this is the international farmed salmon industry, which will be addressed here. Such disinvestment appears paradoxical for at least two reasons. First, the standard wisdom offered by the international marketing literature is that firms make specific investments successively as they expand their international operations. The influential Uppsala internationalization model, for example, describes firms going through a series of stages ranging from no regular export activities, through export via independent representatives, on to the establishment of a foreign sales office, and finally to the establishment of foreign production units (e.g., Johanson & Vahlne, 1977; Johanson & Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975). The history of internationalization in a variety of industries also suggests that such successive involvement followed by increased specific investments seems to be a valid description. Even in the case of firms described as being “born global”, some sort of stepwise—albeit rapid—internationalization, followed by rising levels of specific investment seems to be the pattern. We refer to Andersen (1993), Bjökman and Forsgren (1997), and Liesch et al. (2002) for recent overviews of Nordic contributions to internationalization research.A basic assumption underlying the gradual internationalization model is that firms move away from the “known”, i.e. the domestic market, and towards the “unknown”, i.e. new markets which, due to their novelty and the firms’ consequent lack of knowledge, are often regarded with a high degree of uncertainty. When perceived uncertainty is high, risk-averse firms are expected to abstain from making specific investments. The process model can be described as a “test-the-water” approach. Firms first undertake minor investments in order to learn. Then as they gradually learn to handle new markets and positive outcomes are achieved, perceived uncertainty declines. Firms thus become more confident and willing to make specific investments. This can be described as a kind of risk-reduction behavior. Firms will not make substantial specific downstream investments until they have learnt the new marketing environment and feel that they possess the necessary competencies. Moving towards market-like arrangements seems to indicate that specific investments are being abandoned and represent sunk costs. If firms make specific investments in the initial stages of their international operations, but later discover that the expected sales and profits will never be realized, then such behavior is understandable. However, the focus here is on vertical disinvestment in growing markets. We study firms operating in the international farmed salmon industry, and many firms in this industry made specific investments in foreign sales offices as they embarked on international operations. Over time, however, most of these firms have moved on to more market-like arrangements, such as spot market transactions or long-term relationships with foreign importers.The article is organized as follows. In the next section we review some of the main characteristics of internationalization, as reflected in the international marketing literature. We then present a combination of transaction cost economics (TCE) (Williamson (1985) and Williamson (1991)) and the resource-based view (RBV) (e.g., Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997; Teece, 2003) as an alternative perspective to the internationalization model. Thereafter we describe the farmed salmon industry and the internationalization behavior of firms in this industry. This description is based on prior research (e.g., Grønhaug, 1996; Haugland & Grønhaug, 1996; Haugland, 1991) as well as press reports. We then analyze and explain the paradox of forward vertical disintegration in the expanding and growing international farmed salmon industry, and finally close with a discussion of our main findings.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
The purpose of this article has been to explain an apparent paradox in international marketing. The traditional view of the internationalization process as portrayed in the international marketing literature, is that firms can be expected to become gradually more involved in downstream activities in foreign markets as firms and the industry both become more international. However, contrary to the prediction in Proposition 1, Norwegian exporters established sales offices and sales representatives in several foreign markets in the early stages of internationalization and, as time passed, they disintegrated despite rising sales and a growing dependence on foreign markets. Our analysis showed that the farmed salmon industry was characterized by high levels of market and technical uncertainty in the early stages. Downstream investments were undertaken in these early stages in order to learn about and to educate the market. These investments can be explained mainly in terms of buyers’ lack of knowledge. As the industry developed, the various uncertainties were mitigated and the local actors learnt to appreciate, evaluate and use the product, so that it became easier to conduct transactions with them. The gradual build-up of knowledge among customers can explain the move towards the market-mode of organizing international transactions as predicted in Proposition 2. Greater knowledge and less uncertainty also correspond with the claim made by Langlois that ‘‘when the market provides the right capabilities there is no need for vertical integration because governance costs are reduced substantially’’ (1997). Vertical integration is considered to be an appropriate safeguard against concern about hold-ups and opportunistic behavior. This applies particularly in smallnumber markets for transactions requiring specific investments. However, in the international farmed salmon industry, both buyers and sellers are numerous, and the product is a non-durable good easy to evaluate. Hold-up problems are here of less importance. Furthermore, the transparency in the market and the modest switching and adjustment costs make concern about opportunistic behavior less acute. However, concern about opportunistic behavior can be observed among sellers when dealing with new buyers in recently opened markets, for example by charging guarantees for payment prior to delivery (e.g., Grønhaug, 1996). Many of the empirical studies underlying the internationalization process model have been conducted in small-number markets that offer heterogeneous and complex products requiring specific investments (e.g., Johanson & Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975). Thus, it is possible that the model is biased, as it may be influenced by the specific firms and industries studied. Our analysis also reveals that the boundaries of the firm depend in part on the relative strength of the firm’s capabilities versus the market’s capabilities. If other actors are able to perform specific activities in a more efficient way, then internalizing the activities will not benefit the focal firm. This will also apply when firms have been heavily involved in international markets over a long period of time. The combination of TCE and the RBV, particularly the link between capabilities and transaction costs showing the temporary nature of transaction costs, seems to throw further light on the question of firm boundaries. As regards managerial implications, our study indicates that there are many ways of becoming an international company and of organizing international activities, and that there is no one-to-one relationship between a company’s degree of internationalization and the level of its investments in foreign markets. Managers need to recognize that specific international activities which may be conducted most efficiently in local markets during one period, may be carried out more efficiently from the home market during another period. Mangers should thus carefully evaluate the different options available for organizing their international activities. In evaluating different options, particular attention should be paid to the firm’s own capabilities and to what existing companies in the local markets are good at. A comparison between firm capabilities and market capabilities may be a useful tool for determining how international activities should be organized. In this article we have advanced two competing propositions. The first was based on the internationalization literature, while the second was based on a combination of TCE and the RBV. As noted above, our second proposition yields both explanatory and predictive power, suggesting that this combination of theories may be useful in broadening our knowledge about the complex phenomenon of internationalization. In order to develop a better understanding of the internationalization processes, future research should be based on explicit theories allowing us to identify the drivers of the processes, firm boundaries and changes over time. Future efforts should also include empirical studies in several industries. Key industry characteristics should be explicitly taken into account, so that the descriptive and predictive validity of the theories and the explanations, as well as their limits, can be adequately examined. One timely question to be raised is whether we actually need a specific theory or theories of internationalization. Future empirical studies should use common and accepted theories to a larger extent, and apply the theories on various international settings. In this way international factors can be explicitly taken into account, the specific features of international business may be focused more clearly, and our understanding of the importance and specific effects of international dimensions can be compared to other theoretical explanations.