چه زمانی همکاری ارزش بازار ایجاد میکند؟
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|14622||2006||15 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||9216 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : European Management Journal, Volume 24, Issue 1, February 2006, Pages 1–15
The dramatic increase in interorganizational partnering in the last two decades raises questions regarding the value impact of alliances. Using event study methodology, this paper tests whether stock market reactions differ when an alliance formation or termination is announced. In addition, it provides an in-depth analysis of potential determinants of stock market reactions. The results show that transaction cost theory and signaling theory in tandem provide predictive power explaining the effects of formation and termination announcements. However, the theories propose contradicting effects regarding the impact of firm and alliance characteristics on the value mark-up.
The past two decades have witnessed a dramatic increase in interorganizational partnering. According to Deering et al. (2003), firm collaborations account for 25% of turnover in 2002 of the largest US companies. By 2004, an increase of up to 40% was expected. Whereas for decades, management literature mainly concentrated on hierarchical and market organization, the cooperative interorganization as an intermediate hybrid form (Williamson, 1985) is attracting more and more interest. Drucker (1995) considers this the greatest change in the way corporate structure and business is conducted. Teece (1992, 24) evaluates collaborative organizational forms as a “new and dramatic organizational innovation”.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
The paper sets out to explore, by analyzing stock market returns, whether partnering pays off. The results suggest that transaction cost theory and signaling theory in tandem explain that a formation of an alliance increases firm valuation and an unexpected termination notification decreases firm valuation. The study further explores the determinants that influence the value mark-up of entering alliances. Here, the interplay of the two theories and their predictability requires a closer look into the individual effects. The arguments of transaction cost theory and signaling theory point in the same direction in the case of determinants, though this does not apply to all analyzed determinants. Regarding high-technology versus non-high-technology firms, both the transaction cost view and signaling theory propose that high-technology firms profit more from entering alliances than do non-high-technology firms. The results support this hypothesis. Moreover, both theories suggest an alliance that is connected with an equity investment experiences higher abnormal returns than an alliance without equity participation. However, the results indicate that an alliance announcement in which the announcing firm invests in the partner is punished by significantly lower abnormal returns than an alliance without partner investment.