بودجه بندی، فرد و بازار سرمایه: مورد تنش مالی
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|14688||2007||14 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||7083 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Accounting Forum, Volume 31, Issue 4, December 2007, Pages 384–397
Budgetary control is a major aspect of management control. It has undergone major shifts of emphasis in both the literature and practice in the later part of the 20th century. A significant influence on the changing practices of this aspect of control has been the growth of and increased influence of the capital market. This paper draws on a detailed field study focusing on the problematic nature of budgetary control in a changing operational environment that acknowledges both the importance, internally, of the organisation members and their contribution to continued growth—and externally the growing influence of shareholders on business operations. The focus of the paper is on the effects of the constant pressure of the share price on the case unit of analysis and how that changed the use of the budgetary control system. This change is illustrated both at a macro level of organisational accountability for predicted results and also as it is driven down the organisation to the level of the individual.
The objective of this paper is to explore the relationship between organisational budgetary control and the capital market. The paper describes the changing relationship between the capital market and corporations and focuses on the effects that this changing relationship has had on the operation of organisation control through the use of a budgetary system. The capital market is broadly defined here as the market, or markets, where investment products such as stocks and bonds are bought and sold and commonly referred to as the stock market. Historically firms have focused on the product market from where they derived their revenue through sales of their products or services. Although the two markets are theoretically separate, they have increasingly become mutually dependent with firms having to be successful in mediating their position within both markets. In other words, firms have to be good at not only producing and selling goods and services but also at managing their relationship with their shareholders. Capital market investors demand returns measured by levels of increasing shareholder value. The field-study based case study described and analysed in this paper shows that the firm level accountability for increasing returns is moving increasingly down the organisation to the level of the individual by means of a changing control environment illustrated in this paper through the workings of a budgetary control system. The influence of the capital market on budget implementation is considered in this paper within a case study context of a particular organisation, referred to as Eurel. This is done by connecting the world of the capital market with that of the organisation to show the changing influence on and changing practices of budgetary control. The paper is located within a discussion of key work on budgetary control particularly in the areas of participation, slack, performance measurement, time frames and bias (Argyris, 1952, Hofstede, 1968, Hopwood, 1972, Likert, 1961 and Llewellyn, 1998; Lowe & Shaw, 1968; Merchant, 1985, Otley, 1978, Otley, 2001 and Schiff and Lewin, 1970; Van der Stede, 2000). All of these issues were relevant to Eurel and its organisation members.1 The capital market has impacted on corporations through changing expectations focussing especially on expected performance and growth issues. In recent years, shortening product life cycles and increased competition has meant that sales and profit growth has been difficult to maintain often resulting in a shortfall between actual results versus those predicted. The demand for organisational credibility in the attainment of results has been led especially by institutional shareholders, who no longer show a loyalty to the companies in which they invest (Drucker, 1999, Handy, 1995 and Rappaport, 1986). The movement from individual ownership to larger fund management groups has lead to changes in shareholder priorities (Handy, 1995). The growth in fund management has institutionalised share dealing and ownership (Froud, Johal, & Leaver, 2006). The traditional holding of shares has increasingly been delegated to the fund management community who along with the investment analysts (for example the Wall Street analysts), exercise major steering power and influence over organisations and their strategies. Much of this has been enabled by the ever more remote separation of ownership and the growth in management of international share portfolios (Drucker, 1999 and Handy, 2002). Institutional shareholders (pension funds, private equity funds, and so forth) have had an increasing policy of engaging in what has been described as the active management of funds rather than the previously more common practice of long-term share ownership. Rappaport (1986) notes that portfolio managers compete for best returns by moving in and out of individual stocks with the possible consequence that this is not necessarily based on a company's long-term future goals but on short-term return expectations for shareholders. Institutional investors are increasingly willing to intervene in the affairs of organisations and can influence the manner in which managers carry out their duties. They can influence for example the expectations as to what constitutes a fair return on funds invested and the time frame in which it is expected. Historically, share ownership was more dispersed with the result that there were limits to the boundary of impact that individual owners could make (Berle & Means, 1968; Froud et al., 2006).
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
Conceptually the C.I.P. was a bottom-up system that for a specific time frame attempted to connect the aspirations of the shareholders, the organisation and its members. It was a steering mechanism (control system) used by the company to guide the behaviour of its members. As an ideal organisation budget control system, the unit members rationally accepted the C.I.P. as a legitimate steering mechanism. Its purpose, mode and means appeared to be in keeping with both the expectations of the corporation and the outside world of the shareholders. However as the discussion has outlined, its implementation proved to be problematic. In contrast to the previous less flexible forecast system, the C.I.P. was conceptually viewed as much more relevant and acceptable to the company's aims. The process built from the bottom-up and attempted to shift the boundary of accountability from the company down through the organisation to the level of the individual. This reflected the reality of the wider organisational context including the penetrating influence of the shareholding community and the emphasis placed internally on the importance of the individual. In the case of the C.I.P., the rationally agreed targets should have acted as a discursive guide to organisation behaviour/action. Organisation members acknowledged the pragmatic need for attainment of budget results but at the same time had difficulty in accepting accountability for targets that appeared manipulated and where the intensity of the control environment began to intrude on member's ability to contribute. As noted earlier, somewhere between its conception and objectives, the implementation of the C.I.P. had become tainted. Examples of continuous tinkering with budget inputs created an atmosphere of distrust and made it difficult to gain acceptance for commitments that were dubious in their agreement. Organisation members felt that the process itself lacked the credibility that it sought to attain. The research findings show a conflicting control arena where both idealistic and pragmatic needs for accountability and credibility of results achieved was acknowledged by the organization members. At the same time, there was also recognition of a mismatch in the manner in which the control systems were used to achieve that accountability. Issues such as interference within the C.I.P. process diminished individual member's willingness to contribute. This is turn moved substantially along the continuum of discourse from the more naturally mediating dialogue through to the more power influenced steering of behaviour. This was in danger of creating a work environment where “What you measure is what you get”, meaning the imposition of a context of intensive measurement that was in danger of changing historical work behaviour to a more individually self protective approach to organisational contribution. As members noted, there was an atmosphere of caution developing within the forecasting process. This was part of the need to achieve forecasted results. However, if the C.I.P. system continues to negatively influence the willingness to contribute, then it should not be surprising that organisation members start playing the game by only forecasting that which they know to be acceptably achievable rather than what might be achievable. The empirical data shows a discourse with the capital market that included a pressure for results. This was more in keeping with the discussion end of the discourse continuum as noted earlier (Senge, 1990, p. 15) with the investment community winning the competitive argument. Their influence on corporate credibility resulted in the exertion of pressure that changed the order of things. Rather than there being the natural or previously accepted dialogue and mediation over time, the relationship appeared to change to the extent that the history of mutually mediated space was replaced by the imposition of the controlled use of steering mechanisms such as the budgetary control system. In Habermasian terms, the idealising aspirations of the budget system fell short in its role of mediator in accepted rationality between the organisation, the individual members and the capital market. In this sense the steering media had begun to constitute or force a mode of behaviour on individual members that appeared to be historically unnatural. For the individual within Eurel there was a developing sense of a short-term outlook that had started to show itself in a restrained contribution to the organisation with possible consequences for the future flow of new products and associated earnings.