افشاگری شرکت مبتنی بر اینترنت و ارزش بازار : شواهدی از امریکا لاتین
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|14758||2013||19 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||10782 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Emerging Markets Review, Volume 17, December 2013, Pages 150–168
We examine the relationship between an Internet-based corporate disclosure index and firm value in the seven largest stock markets of Latin America. We find, after controlling for firms' characteristics, industry and country of origin, that an increase of 1% in the Internet-Based Corporate Disclosure Index causes an increase of 0.1592% in the Tobin's Q and an increase of 0.0119% in the firm's ROA. These findings are robust after considering the potential endogeneity of our regression variables. The evidence contributes to the literature suggesting that firms can differentiate themselves by self-adopting better financial and corporate disclosure measures using the Internet.
The modern company operates surrounded by a series of conflicts of interest, particularly those that arise between managers and shareholders, and between controlling and minority shareholders. One of the main objectives of the study of corporate governance consists of trying to eliminate or, at least, attempt to mitigate these conflicts. The other main objective consists of assuring that the assets of companies are used efficiently and in the best interests of shareholders. In order to make sure that shareholders perceive an appropriate yield on their investments, throughout the years they have defined a range of rights in an attempt to safeguard their interests, such as: rights of decision, rights of control, rights of protection, the right to perceive dividends and the right to be informed. This paper is focused on the last of these rights.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
Extant theory suggests the existence of three channels through which financial information enhances financial performance. First, financial accounting information assist investors and managers in recognizing investment opportunities thus reducing estimation risks and the cost of capital. Second, the disclosure of financial information improves financial performance through its governance role by disciplining the productive use of assets, by reducing the expropriation risk of investors by managers, and by enhancing the process of project selection. Finally, the disclosure of financial information improves financial performance by lowering liquidity risk and adverse selection. However, the disclosure of financial information imposes extra costs on firms which can impact firm value negatively.