تاثیر اصل حاکمیت قانون بر ایجاد ارزش بازار برای شرکای ائتلاف محلی در کشورهای BRIC
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|14776||2012||17 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of International Management, Volume 18, Issue 4, December 2012, Pages 305–321
Market value creation for the local partner in an international strategic alliance (ISA) that takes place in a developed market economy is well documented; however, value creation for the local partner of an alliance in an emerging market (EM) has received less attention. We contend that rule of law is a key driver of value creation for the local partner because weak rule of law in an EM may suppress the foreign partner's willingness to share its valuable knowledge assets, which are a critical source of value for the EM partner. While rule of law directly affects value creation from the ISA for the EM partner, we argue that alliance type (R&D vs. non-R&D) and local partner type (state owned vs. non-state owned) are important moderators of this relationship. We find support for our arguments in an analysis of 902 ISAs in the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) countries over 1991–2005.
Strategic alliances enable partner firms to pool their resources and capabilities to develop new technologies and technological capabilities that they cannot develop on their own due to direct costs and/or risks (e.g., Duysters and Hagedoorn, 1996, Hitt et al., 2000, Li et al., 2008, Tallman and Chacar, 2011 and Tjemkes et al., 2012). In an efficient stock market, investors recognize the long-term strategic advantages associated with alliance formation and react positively to alliance announcements (i.e., positive abnormal stock market return) (Anand and Khanna, 2000, Das et al., 1998 and Kogut, 1988).
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
The present study sought to deepen our understanding of international strategic alliances by focusing on market value creation for the emerging market (local) partner. Our results suggest that investors do not assume that EM partners will unambiguously gain access to the new technologies/knowledge residing with their foreign partners. Moreover, the results suggest that investors expect, when rule of law is weak, that the foreign partner will be less motivated to share knowledge or at least will implement more safeguards to prevent knowledge leakages. These overprotective actions of the foreign partner inhibit rather than help the local EM partner's ability to acquire the requisite knowledge resources to develop its own capabilities, and thus reduce the market value creation impacts of the alliance for the EM partner.