هزینه های معامله، انعطافناپذیری نهادی و اندازه از مکانیزم توسعه پاک
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|15288||2005||13 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||7697 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Energy Policy, Volume 33, Issue 4, March 2005, Pages 511–523
هزینه های معامله CDM و موانع نهادی
شواهد تجربی برای costs2 معامله CDM
مدل تاثیر هزینه های معامله و
انعطافناپذیری نهادی در بازار CDM
تجزیه و تحلیل حساسیت در تامین CDM
Transaction costs and institutional rigidities will reduce the attractiveness of the Kyoto Protocol flexibility mechanisms compared to domestic greenhouse gas abatement options. The clean development mechanism (CDM) in particular is likely to entail considerable costs of baseline development, project registration, verification and certification. The activities implemented jointly pilot phase and the prototype carbon fund programme give indications about these costs. There is evidence that projects with high implementation costs have high transaction costs as well. Moreover, CDM projects have to be approved by host country institutions, and so far only a small share of host countries has been able to set up these institutions. Several of the larger host countries intend to only approve projects if the market price is above a certain threshold. Some governments will also levy fees to finance costs of approval bodies. We assess these issues using a quantitative model of the Kyoto Protocol permit market. We conclude that while changes in demand from Annex B countries remain the crucial factor, the size of the CDM will depend to a significant degree on transaction costs and institutional barriers in host countries.
The Kyoto Protocol allows industrialised countries and countries in transition (Annex B countries) to generate greenhouse gas emission credits through investment in emission reduction projects in countries without emission targets. This instrument is called the “clean development mechanism” (CDM), and the emission credits are called “certified emission reductions” (CERs). Theoretically the CDM will lead to an equalisation of marginal abatement costs throughout the world. A number of modelling exercises have calculated a global market price assuming friction-free trading of emission credits (Weyant, 1999; Springer, 2003). However, it is becoming increasingly clear that there will be substantial transaction costs and other institutional barriers that could considerably reduce the size and change the distribution of the CDM. So far, they have been addressed only in a few models, usually by shifting marginal abatement costs curves vertically (e.g. Böhringer and Löschel, 2002, p. 152ff). We investigate the emerging evidence on CDM transaction costs, incorporate the findings in a simple model of the global market for greenhouse gas permits, and analyse a range of scenarios.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
The size of the CDM will depend, among other factors, on transaction costs. Evidence fromAIJ and emerging CDM projects shows that transaction costs can account for a significant share of the total cost of CDM projects, especially in a market characterised byone moves to project categories with higher implementation costs, and smaller projects will be at a disadvantage because fixed costs become a major factor. Institutional rigidities and taxes on CDM projects levied by host countries are also likely to restrict CDM supply. Some developing countries may decide not to enter the CDM market if permit prices are low. This in turn would tend to benefit the remaining CDM suppliers and other sellers of emission permits. Our modelling results show the importance of these supply side factors for the size of and revenue fromthe CDM. Still, demand side factors have overwhelming importance for the CDM. The aggregate effective emission reduction commitment by those Annex B countries participating in the Kyoto Protocol is small, and the global carbon market in the first commitment period (2008–2012) will likely be characterised by low demand and low prices. Uncertainty remains about key market parameters such as effective emission reductions required in Annex B countries and permit supply from Russia and the Ukraine. The prospect for large-scale emission reductions in developing countries through CDM projects appears slim in the medium term, but a sufficient number of CDM projects to gather experience and build institutions could still be achieved. The quality of domestic institutions, internal political stability, and efforts to market CDM projects to investors, will all be crucial for individual countries to secure their share in the emerging CDM market. Low permit prices create pressure to keep transaction costs low, for example by streamlining CDM related institutions and procedures. Experience fromthe AIJ pilot phase leads us to be sceptical about the potential for many developing countries to participate in a low-cost CDM; at the same time, the lowest cost reduction options are often not the most desirable projects froma host country’s development viewpoint. Trade-offs between cost efficiency and development benefits will be a major challenge for CDM implementation. low permit prices. Transaction costs tend to increase as