تاثیر نامشخص در بازار اوراق قرضه شهری
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|15319||2002||16 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Volume 13, Issue 2, April 2002, Pages 195–210
The municipal bond market is currently a topic of SEC scrutiny, courtroom debate, congressional investigation and media investigation in both the financial and general press. Rule G-37 (MSRB 1994) prohibits any player in the bond market from doing business with a state or local government or their funding entities for 2 years after that firm’s dealers, bond professionals or political action committee(s) contribute to an officeholder in those governments. This rule was prompted by the widespread perception that influence over municipal bond transactions is routinely used by elected officials to extract contributions from market players. This rule has also exposed the MSRB to intense criticism that it is de facto interfering in the political process. This research project addresses one aspect of the controversy: the reputed relation between political contributions and municipal bond transactions. We use elected officials and related bond issues in the State of Louisiana as the study subject. Our results provide only weak support for a connection between contributions from market players and the cost of public issues.