عملکرد بازار ارتباطات از راه دور چین: سیاست های نظارتی جدید
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|15443||2004||18 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Telecommunications Policy, Volume 28, Issues 9–10, October–November 2004, Pages 715–732
The structure, conduct, and performance of Chinese telecommunications are analyzed to determine reform's impact on policy objectives. Recent performance suggests that a more comprehensive reform is needed. However, China's fragmented policy environment makes large-scale reform difficult. Further deregulation of the telecommunication industry requires several related initiatives: reduction of entry barriers, creation of a universal service fund (to defuse stakeholder concerns regarding access), and formation of a cross-sector antitrust regulatory agency (with a special interest in promoting competition where feasible). While these policies could further complicate decision making in a fragmented institutional environment, each initiative is directed at neutralizing powerful stakeholders who can block or delay reform.
Recent reforms in Chinese telecommunications have led to significant capacity investment, which has promoted service expansion and the introduction of new technologies. However, improved sector performance requires changes in industry structure and incumbent behavior. The next stage of policymaking requires a coordinated approach that addresses three major problems. The first problem is a market structure with substantial incumbent market power. When an incumbent exercises market power, telecommunications customers face high prices and a narrow range of service options. The second problem in China is one of cross-subsidies: from the telecom sector to postal services and from urban to rural areas. Future claims on subsidies will come from citizens in some rural areas who are not served by telecommunications companies at present. The current system of regulatory taxation creates constituencies who wish to maintain entry barriers and protect transfers to rural areas.1 The third problem involves anticompetitive behavior by an incumbent. Predatory actions and interconnection delays harm entrants and ultimately limit consumer choice. Stakeholders benefiting from current arrangements support high entry barriers and a de-emphasis of multiple centers of initiative. A new cross-sector antitrust authority would be a powerful advocate for remedies and reforms to promote telecommunications competition. A framework for analyzing policy initiatives is presented to demonstrate that the three problems cannot be dealt with in isolation. China's reform experience to date has brought lessons for policymakers that will help shape the next stage of reform. Of course, institutional conditions in China place constraints on the nature of policy initiatives. Another feature influencing telecommunications developments is how international perceptions affect foreign investment and international business alliances. General economic conditions and resource availability in input markets also have implications for the timing of investments in the industry. These features all affect basic industry conditions, which in turn influence industry structure, corporate conduct, and market performance. Of course, public policy determines industry structure (through the erection or reduction of entry barriers) and affects the behavior of market participants. While retail pricing behavior is often the focus of attention, other aspects of corporate conduct (like interconnection) have an even greater impact on industry performance and associated customer satisfaction. The next section incorporates these features into a comprehensive framework for analyzing prospects for change
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
There is statistical evidence that comprehensive reform (including privatization, liberalization/competition, and the introduction of an independent regulator) promotes the availability of telecommunications services, service quality, and labor productivity (Fink, Mattoo, & Rathindran, 2001). The framework presented here directs attention to the next stage of China's telecom industry reform: addressing universal service, improving incentives for cost containment, and creating a cross-sector antitrust authority. When considering universal service, targeted cross-subsidies funded through non-distorting taxes can diffuse general concerns that low income and rural customers will be harmed by reform. Focusing on incentives for production efficiency is another priority, since value creation can benefit both suppliers and consumers. In addition, strengthening the regulatory process and setting up an antitrust mechanism are essential to the reform process and for harnessing entrepreneurial initiative. The fundamental conclusion is that, where competition is not feasible, the emerging regulatory framework must establish rules and incentive mechanisms that promote transparency, consistency, and broader stakeholder participation in the process. These steps can help limit the power of special interests. The framework presented here provides a set of organizing concepts for analyzing the determinants of market performance. In addition, it underscores the factors that warrant intensive investigation in the future.