نظم و انضباط بازار و بیمه سپرده
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|15471||2004||25 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||11492 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of Monetary Economics, Volume 51, Issue 2, March 2004, Pages 375–399
Cross-country evidence presented in this paper suggests that explicit deposit insurance reduces required deposit interest rates, while at the same time it lowers market discipline on bank risk taking. Internationally, deposit insurance schemes vary widely in their coverage, funding, and management. This reflects that there are widely differing views on how deposit insurance should optimally be structured. To inform this debate, we use a newly constructed data set of deposit insurance design features to examine how different design features affect deposit interest rates and market discipline.
In the last two decades, we have seen a series of banking crises around the world where banks have become systematically insolvent. Banking crises have occurred in developed and developing countries alike. Prominently, the Asian crisis of 1997 involved banking crises in Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Korea, with banks becoming insolvent after economic downturns and currency devaluations. Systemic bank insolvencies involve huge costs to the banks themselves, their customers and to governments. Bank failures may lead to the destruction of a bank's information capital garnered in previously nurtured bank-customer relationships. A disruption of bank lending and of the payments system may also cause a reduction in investment and other economic activity. Further, bank depositors potentially lose heavily because of bank failures. Last but not least, governments tend to incur large costs in remedying a banking crisis. To make financial system breakdowns less likely and to limit their costs if they occur, all countries of the world have financial safety nets in place.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
Policy makers around the world design and operate financial safety nets so as to prevent costly bank insolvencies. However, designing and implementing an effective safety net is a difficult task, since overgenerous protection of banks may easily introduce risk-enhancing moral hazard, and destabilize the very system it is meant to protect. The challenge facing policy makers is to provide depositor protection without unduly undermining market discipline. The design of the safety net is therefore crucial in providing the right mix of market and regulatory discipline of banks. A considerable amount of theoretical and prescriptive literature exists on this issue. At this point, empirical work is desperately needed to better inform policy recommendations. Empirical work of this kind has been lacking because of an absence of available information on safety net design across countries. Using cross-country information on deposit insurance systems, we investigate the impact of explicit deposit insurance and its key features on bank interest rates and market discipline. Our results show that the existence of an explicit insurance lowers banks’ interest expenses and makes interest payments less sensitive to bank risk. Thus explicit deposit insurance is found to reduce market discipline on banks by their creditors