شفافیت سیستم بانکی و بهره وری اجرایی بانک مبتنی بر اطلاعاتی
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|15477||2006||25 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of Financial Intermediation, Volume 15, Issue 3, July 2006, Pages 307–331
In this paper, we investigate the relationship between the transparency of banks and the fragility of the banking system. We show that information-based bank runs may be inefficient because the deposit contract designed to provide liquidity induces depositors to have excessive incentives to withdraw. An improvement in the transparency of a bank may reduce depositor welfare by increasing the chance of an inefficient contagious run on other banks. A deposit insurance system in which some depositors are fully insured and the others are partially insured can ameliorate this inefficiency. Under such a system, bank runs can serve as an efficient mechanism for disciplining banks. We also consider bank managers' control over the timing of information disclosure, and find that bank managers may use their influence to eliminate both inefficient and efficient bank runs.
Imposing market discipline to alleviate the banks' moral hazard problems has become an important part of bank regulations around the world. In the new Basel Capital Accord, market discipline is recognized as one of the three “pillars” of the new regulation framework. As stated in a consultative document of the Basel Committee, “… market discipline has the potential to reinforce capital regulation and other supervisory efforts to promote safety and soundness in banks and financial systems. Market discipline imposes strong incentives on banks to conduct their business in a safe, sound, and efficient manner.”1
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
In this paper, we show that improvements in the transparency of the banking system may increase the chance of a contagious bank run. We also discuss the possibility of using deposit insurance to improve the efficiency of bank runs. In addition, we illustrate how our results will change when bank managers can control the timing of information disclosure. Our paper has empirical implications. It implies that fundamentally weaker banks are more likely to suffer runs. It also predicts that contagious runs are more likely to occur when the correlation between banks' returns is higher. In addition, it provides an explanation for why suspension of convertibility can reduce the probability of a bank closure.