واردات، ورود و قانون رقابت به عنوان نظم بازار
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|15483||2007||28 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : European Economic Review, Volume 51, Issue 4, May 2007, Pages 831–858
Numerous countries have adopted or strengthened competition laws in the past two decades. At the same time, domestic industries in most countries are facing ever more intense pressure from imports. In this paper we study the impact of competition law on domestic competition for a large number of countries over time, controlling for the presence of imports and the number of domestic firms. We find that while industries that have higher import exposure or larger numbers of domestic firms tend to be more competitive, the direct effect of competition law on competition is insignificant. However, we also find that industries that operate under a competition law tend to have a larger number of domestic firms. This suggests that competition laws may have an indirect effect on domestic competition by promoting entry.
Lately, the subject of competition law has attracted significant interest in terms of both academic research and policy debates. This in part reflects the wave of countries that have adopted or strengthened competition laws in the past two decades despite the rising competition due to globalization, as well as the recent international efforts to define rules in this area.1 While trade liberalization and removal of regulations restricting entry have been advocated as powerful and administratively simple ways of enhancing competition (Bhagwati, 1968), relatively little cross-country empirical work has been done to identify the effect of competition law on the contestability of markets. For OECD countries this is an interesting research question, but not of major policy significance given that competition enforcement has been long established in most jurisdictions.2 In many developing countries, however, the question is more fundamental and centers on whether to adopt such laws and if so what type of competition policy will be most beneficial. Any answer to such questions would ideally be informed by evidence on the effects of competition legislation and enforcement.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
In the past two decades, numerous countries have adopted competition laws in order to promote domestic competition. This paper is a first effort to estimate both the effects of competition law adoption on industry markups and on the number of firms. Our results suggest that the direct effect of competition law on industry markup is unclear. Industry markups tend to be lower for industries that face higher levels of import competition, and for industries that have a larger number of domestic firms. This is true even if the analysis is restricted to the more concentrated industries or to the sub-sample of high-income countries. On the other hand, we do find statistical evidence suggesting that competition laws have a significant effect in increasing the number of firms in the longer run, which indirectly lowers industry markups, especially in the highly concentrated markets.3