توجه در مالکیت بانک خارجی و نظارت: مقایسه بین المللی
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|15489||2008||8 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of Banking & Finance, Volume 32, Issue 2, February 2008, Pages 338–345
This paper empirically analyzes the relation between foreign bank ownership and the three pillars of the New Basel Capital Accord (i.e., capital regulatory oversight, supervisory oversight, and market discipline). Using a new database covering 153 countries, we find that countries with greater market discipline have a lower presence of foreign banks operating in their economy. Furthermore, our evidence indicates that capital regulatory oversight and supervisory oversight are not significantly related to foreign bank ownership.
A well-functioning financial system is important to promote economic growth and stability, particularly in low and middle-income countries (Levine, 2005 and Barth et al., 2006; hereafter BCL). In addition, a growing body of research shows that, in order to provide strong and stable financial markets, better informed management and improved supervisory practices, along with more reliable information, are needed (see Barth et al., 2004, Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2004 and Barth et al., 2007). In particular, recommendations from the industrialized countries that comprise the Basel Committee, labeled the New Basel Financial Accord, or Basel II, provide such guidelines. The Basel II guidelines, which were to be implemented in 2006, are categorized into three pillars: capital regulatory oversight, supervisory oversight, and market discipline. The goal of these risk-based measures is to promote efficient capital allocation by (1) encouraging banks to utilize risk-based capital ratios, (2) increasing the ability of regulatory officials to oversee banks, and (3) improving the quality of information disseminated to the market.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
It is widely recognized that well-functioning banking systems are vital to providing an economic environment that promotes growth and stability. It is also well documented that the degree of government bank ownership acts as a deterrent to sound and efficient banking systems and also has contributed, at least in part, to financial crises around the globe. In contrast, some studies show that foreign bank ownership promotes better banking practices. To date, however, there is no evidence on how regulatory guidelines and policy correlate with the degree of foreign bank ownership. In light of the financial crises over the past two decades, an emerging consensus between policymakers and industry participants is that a new and insightful approach to supervision and regulation needs to be applied. In response to this need, the Basel Committee has provided risk-based guidelines addressing capital regulatory oversight, supervisory oversight, and market discipline.