ساختار مالکیت و ریسک در بانک های متعلق به بخش خصوصی و دولتی
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|15554||2011||14 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of Banking & Finance, Volume 35, Issue 5, May 2011, Pages 1327–1340
Using detailed ownership data for a sample of European commercial banks, we analyze the link between ownership structure and risk in both privately owned and publicly held banks. We consider five categories of shareholders that are specific to our dataset. We find that ownership structure is significant in explaining risk differences but mainly for privately owned banks. A higher equity stake of either individuals/families or banking institutions is associated with a decrease in asset risk and default risk. In addition, institutional investors and non-financial companies impose the riskiest strategies when they hold higher stakes. For publicly held banks, changes in ownership structure do not affect risk taking. Market forces seem to align the risk-taking behavior of publicly held banks, such that ownership structure is no longer a determinant in explaining risk differences. However, higher stakes of banking institutions in publicly held banks are associated with lower credit and default risk.
The past three decades have been characterized by repeated banking crises, such as the financial crisis of 2008, the US savings and loans debacle of the 1980s, the 1994–1995 Mexican crisis, and the 1997 Asian and 1998 Russian financial crises. Such episodes highlight the inherently unstable nature of banking and the tendency of banks toward excessive risk taking. In this paper, we focus on a driving force behind the risk-taking incentives of banks—namely, shareholders’ behavior and their incentives to take higher risk. The issue of ownership structure is of particular interest for the banking industry because several factors interact with and alter governance, such as the quality of bank regulation and supervision and the opacity of bank assets. Moreover, banking systems have faced major changes during the past 20 years. With financial deregulation and market integration, the scope of banks’ activities has been completely reshaped, from traditional intermediation products to an array of new businesses. These trends have led to substantial consolidation in the banking industry and, consequently, to significant changes in ownership and capital structure. In addition, institutional ownership of common stock has increased substantially over the past 20 years, which also implies changes in corporate governance and banks’ behavior in terms of risk taking.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
Table 3 and Table 4 show the results obtained for Models 1 and 2. Because we do not face strong endogeneity issues, as discussed previously, we use OLS estimation techniques with the Heckman correction.26 We also correct for heteroskedasticity following White’s methodology. As we remove the ownership component “institutional investors” from Models 1 and 2, the estimated coefficient associated with each ownership component must be interpreted as the effect of a substitution between this component and the INSTITUT component.