بهره سپرده بین بانکی و نظم و انضباط در بازار: شواهد از مرکز و شرق اروپا
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|15567||2013||17 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||13140 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of Comparative Economics, Volume 41, Issue 2, May 2013, Pages 544–560
There is a considerable debate on the role played by market discipline in the banking industry. Using data for 207 banks across 10 Central and Eastern European countries, this paper empirically analyzes the disciplining role of interbank deposits. We find that market discipline has been effective in Central and Eastern Europe since the implementation of explicit deposit insurance. However, several factors affect the strength of this discipline. State-owned banks are not disciplined probably because they benefit from implicit insurance. Institutional and legal factors, and resolution strategies adopted by countries during banking crises also impact bank risk and the effectiveness of market discipline. Our results indicate that stronger regulatory discipline reduces risk but also weakens market discipline.
Economists and bank regulators have shown a growing interest in favoring the reliance on market forces and higher involvement of private agents such as uninsured creditors to monitor banks (Flannery, 2001 and BIS, 2003). Concomitantly, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has designated market discipline the third of the three pillars of the regulatory framework. Market forces are assumed to reinforce bank capital regulation and supervision to ensure the safety of the banking system. However, for market discipline to be effective, several conditions must be fulfilled: market agents must feel at risk and must have sufficient information about the actual riskiness of banks (Hamalainen et al., 2005 and Nier and Baumann, 2006). Thus, explicit deposit insurance with a coverage limit might serve as a signal that eliminates the unlimited coverage of the de facto implicit deposit insurance system.1 However, even in presence of explicit insurance other factors are likely to affect the incentives of uninsured creditors to monitor banks. Some banks can still benefit from implicit government insurance. For example, state-owned banks might be considered by uninsured creditors as implicitly insured which should remove their incentives to monitor them (Borisova and Megginson, 2012).
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
The purpose of this study is to assess the disciplinary role of interbank deposits as well as the institutional and bank specific factors affecting its effectiveness. Using a sample of 207 banks from 10 countries of Central and Eastern Europe, we find, by controlling for various factors, that interbank deposits do play a disciplinary role in the presence of explicit insurance and refrain banks from excessive risk taking. Our results also indicate that the market is more lenient with state owned-banks possibly because they are perceived as implicitly insured by the government even in the presence of explicit limited insurance. We also find that the extent of the insurer’s power impacts market discipline: market discipline is effective only when deposit insurer power is low suggesting that the presence of a more powerful insurer undermines market discipline by lowering the incentives of market participants to monitor banks.