نهادهای بازار کار، مهارت های شرکت خاص و الگوهای تجارت
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|15772||2012||15 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||15003 کلمه|
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Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of International Economics, Volume 87, Issue 2, July 2012, Pages 337–351
This paper studies how a country's labor market institutions, by affecting workers' skill acquisition, can shape its export patterns. I develop an open-economy model in which workers undertake non-contractible activities to acquire firm-specific skills on the job. In the model, labor market protection raises workers' incentives to acquire firm-specific skills relative to general skills, turning labor laws into a source of comparative advantage. In particular, the model shows that countries with more protective labor laws export relatively more in firm-specific skill-intensive sectors at both the intensive and extensive margins. To test the theoretical predictions, I construct sector proxies for the firm-specific and industry-specific skill intensity by estimating returns to firm tenure and industry tenure for different U.S. manufacturing sectors during the 1974–1993 period. By estimating sector-level gravity equations for 84 countries using the Helpman–Melitz–Rubinstein (2008) framework, I find evidence supporting the predicted effects of labor market institutions at both margins of exports.
Recent research in international trade shows that a country's contracting and legal institutions can shape its comparative advantage.1 Labor market institutions, which vary widely across countries, receive relatively less attention in the literature on international trade patterns. Although there is an extensive strand of research examining how labor market regulations are linked to labor market outcomes, little work has been done to examine their effects on workers' investment decisions. Even less has been written about how such effects can determine a country's comparative advantage.2
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
This paper identifies a new source of comparative advantage arising from the interaction between workers' on-the-job skill acquisition and a country's labor regulations. I develop a simple model to show that workers have more incentives to acquire firm-specific skills relative to general skills in more protective labor markets. Embedding this model in a multi-sector open-economy framework shows that countries with a more protective labor market are more likely to export and export relatively more in industries for which firm-specific skills are more important. Importantly, I show that this endogenous channel of comparative advantage is independent of the previously examined channel through which labor market institutions affect trade patterns.