بازار منطبق غیر متمرکز با حقوق درون زا
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|16227||2008||26 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||16513 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 64, Issue 1, September 2008, Pages 193–218
In a Shapley–Shubik assignment problem with a supermodular output matrix, we consider games in which each firm makes a take-it-or-leave-it salary offer to one applicant, and a match is made only when the offer is accepted by her. We consider both one-shot and multistage games. In either game, we show that there can be many equilibrium salary vectors which are higher or lower than the minimum competitive salary vector. If we exclude artificial equilibria, applicants' equilibrium salary vectors are bounded above by the minimal competitive salary vector, while firms' equilibrium payoff vectors are bounded below by the payoff vector under the minimum competitive salary vector. This suggests that adopting the minimum competitive salary vector as the equilibrium outcome in decentralized markets does not have a strong justification.