در جستجوی مشاوره برای شرکت کنندگان در بازارهای منطبق با استفاده از الگوریتم معوق پذیرش
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|16243||2004||22 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 48, Issue 2, August 2004, Pages 249–270
Many centralized entry-level labor markets use the firm-proposing deferred-acceptance (DA) algorithm to compute the matching that is implemented among workers and firms. We propose a definition of the strategic options a worker faces in the DA-algorithm. Then we develop a theory to advise workers who distinguish between the firms from which they believe not to receive a proposal, the firms from which they might receive a proposal, and the firms from which they certainly receive a proposal. If a worker is not able to deduce which new proposals she receives after having rejected others, then it is not profitable for her to submit a list that reverses the true ranking of any two acceptable firms. Furthermore, it is not beneficial for her to include a firm in her submitted list that is unacceptable to her.