وسایل نقلیه الکتریکی در بازار ملی برق استرالیا: بازار انرژی و مفاهیم سیاست
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|16460||2012||25 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : The Electricity Journal, Volume 25, Issue 2, March 2012, Pages 63–87
EVs would represent a new load, and would represent a sizable increase to the aggregate demand of an individual household. But EV take-up rates are likely to be gradual, and therefore changes to the NEM's aggregate demand will be equally incremental, not radical. For this reason, EV loads should not be considered either as a problem or a panacea for the grid over the short to medium term.
Australia is a relatively small country in relation to the world population and by implication, global influence. As energy policies are often geopolitical in nature, some components of Australian policymaking could be argued to be “policy taking” rather than “policy making.” It is in this context that the electric vehicle (EV) market is likely to develop in Australia. Globally, there are sign posts that point toward a long-run shift in transportation policy away from liquid fossil fuels, and toward electricity. The reason for this is straightforward; while the CO2 intensity of the existing power system may present only modest environmental gains from consumers switching from internal combustion engines to EVs, over the very long run, the gains are potentially very significant compared to business as usual. The success or failure of EVs to imbed within transportation paradigms is likely to be decided globally, and so we believe that Australia is likely to be an adopter of policies that are consistent with the rest of the world. There are two main public policy drivers which are likely to result in the increased uptake of vehicles that are not powered conventionally (i.e., by gasoline and diesel). These relate to constraining anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions with a view to reducing CO2-equivalent concentrations in the atmosphere to limit climate change; and reducing the reliance of economies on imported liquid fuels, which are becoming scarcer and are sourced from volatile regions in the world. Policies aimed at achieving these objectives are being increasingly adopted. Vivid Economics (2010) found that there were 32 operating greenhouse gas emissions trading schemes in different countries in 2010. Renewable portfolio standards are also common with policies established in regions as diverse as Texas and China. Transportation comprises around half the global emissions produced by the combustion of fossil fuels (Baumert, Herzog and Pershing, 2005). It is clear that reducing emissions from the combustion of fossil fuels by any material amount to 2050 is not compatible with simply improving the efficiency of petrol and diesel engines. The long-term solution to reducing emissions within the transportation sector requires substitution of the internal combustion engine with alternative power systems. This is evidenced by the decision of the European Union to include transport in its renewable energy requirements of member nations by 2020. Energy security will also remain a primary concern of policy makers. Figure 1 outlines the distribution of global energy reserves by geographic region. Oil and gas are primarily located in two regions: the Middle East and Russia (Europe). With 61 percent of oil used for transportation, the geographic distribution of liquid fuels creates significant risks for developed and developing economies. Supply disruptions may arise due to regional conflict and price pressures due to cartel structures. Around the world, countries are beginning to establish policies to reduce their reliance on “foreign oil.” The physical distribution of global energy reserves is not the only concern of policymakers in relation to energy security. Fossil fuels are finite resources and will be depleted at some unknown point in the future. The concept of “peak oil” has been around for decades yet it is impossible to accurately predict when supplies will eventually run out. Reserve to production ratios can be used to accurately determine temporal supply capacities based upon current consumption rates, production technologies, and known reserves. In relation to oil and gas estimates: • Oil: There are currently known global reserves of 1,331 billion barrels of oil. Based upon production rates of around 80 million barrels of oil per day, there is around 45 years of supply left. However, production of oil has increased by only 7 percent over the past 10 years whereas known reserves have increased by 20 percent over the same period (BP, 2010). • Gas: There are currently known global reserves of 187 trillion cubic meters. Based upon current production rates of 2,987 billion cubic meters per year, there is about 62 years of supply remaining. Both production of gas and known reserves have increased by around 20 percent since the year 2000 (BP, 2010). While production-to-reserve ratios of 45 years and 62 years for oil and gas respectively seem to be far enough in the future “not to worry,” policymakers in developed economies are acutely aware of the rising consumption of the developing world. China's oil consumption has roughly doubled over the past 10 years and India's consumption has increased by around 50 percent over the same time period (BP, 2010). Australia is not an “energy-secure” nation in relation to liquid fuels. As far back as 1974, Australian policymakers considered whether EVs should be encouraged to reduce Australia's reliance on “foreign oil.” In value terms, Australia imports as much oil as it exports coal. Figure 2 outlines the value of coal exports and oil imports since 1980. The significant increase in value associated with coal exports and oil imports over the last decade is largely due to commodity prices increasing substantially due to unprecedented global demand. It is clear that Australia faces the same physical supply risks associated with oil supplies as other nations. Another significant implication of Figure 2 relating to Australia's macroeconomic policy objectives is the structure of our international trading position. Around half of Australia's export income comes from coal (18 percent) and minerals such as iron ore (30 percent). Conversely, half of Australia's imports are related to household consumption (30 percent) and liquid fuels (20 percent). Accordingly, our international trading position is highly exposed to commodity price fluctuations and global demand for commodities. Furthermore, our ability to pay for imported household items depends upon the continued success of our mining and energy sectors. Policymakers are generally not concerned with international trading positions (even large current account deficits) if they are enhancing the productive capacity of the nation. However, Australia's trading position is to some degree structurally problematic because it is not biased toward enhancing the productive capacity of the economy. Reducing our reliance on imported liquid fuels would be an important step in improving our structural trade position. Based upon an analysis of global energy markets and Australia's position therein, over the medium to long term, our view is that policymakers are likely to increasingly favor forms of transportation that are not reliant upon oil. An obvious substitute for oil is the EV. The world has around 120 years of coal supply left based upon current production rates and electricity can also be sourced from low-emissions gas, nuclear, and renewables. An EV that is cost-comparable with current internal combustion engine vehicles would be a solution to many of the concerns of energy policymakers around the world. Based upon this macroeconomic policy environment, various international governments have introduced targets for EVs, as summarized in Table 1. Australia does not have a government-imposed EV mandate. However, the fact that targets and mandates exist in other countries should help to drive technology improvements and cost reductions elsewhere, and ceteris paribus, help facilitate adoption in Australia over time. If the international situation is any guide, it is probable that local, state or federal governments may pursue EV targets, mandates, or incentives to address climate change, energy security, or to stimulate domestic automotive manufacturing; we explore this further in Section VI. The purpose of this article is to review the electricity load impacts arising from growth in the passenger EV market, the implications for the NEM, and to begin to explore the role that policies, regulations, and companies can play in the EV marketplace. In Section II, the dominance of the internal combustion engine vehicle market is examined and various alternatives to the current vehicle fleet, including EVs, are introduced. Section III shows how the barriers to EV adoption are being overcome. Section IV discusses the opportunity for decarbonizing the transportation fleet. Section V explores scenarios for EV adoption and forecasts the potential additional electricity load, and the possible shape of that load depending on when EVs are charged. Section VI discusses why these scenarios could be too pessimistic, considering the likelihood of government incentives to accelerate the EV market. The difficulties of using EVs to feed electricity back into the grid at times of peak demand are reviewed in Section VII. Section VIII explores neighborhood-level issues and how best to deal with this. Section IX puts the discussion into context for policy and regulatory settings and highlights how governments and companies might act in the interests of the market and electricity consumers, and concluding remarks follow.