تجزیه و تحلیل گزینه های طراحی برای بازار برای تعادل بین مرزی برق
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|16753||2013||10 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||8530 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Utilities Policy, Volume 27, December 2013, Pages 39–48
A set of design variables is used to define balancing market design. Performance criteria are defined and the market designs are evaluated using weights and scores for each performance criterion. It is concluded that solutions based on trading between Balancing Service Providers and Transmission System Operators will reduce socio-economic welfare. Major causes for this result are a reduction of the effectiveness of the balancing markets, a reduction in balancing planning accuracy, a reduction in price efficiency and a decrease in dynamic efficiency. The designs with a Common Merit Order List perform well in the evaluation, although reservation of cross-border capacity will be a challenge.
With the objective to increase the efficiency of the European electricity market, the EU is moving in the direction of a single electricity market, enabling electricity trade with the EU similar to trade in goods and services, helping to keep prices as low as possible and to increase standards of service and security of supply. Directive 2003/54/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity, gave common rules for the internal electricity market. This Directive aimed to ensure a level playing field in generation and to reduce the risks of market dominance, to provide third-party grid access rights, to protect the rights of small customers and to disclose information on energy sources for electricity generation, among others. It was subsequently repealed by Directive 2009/72/EC that strengthens these issues and also puts major weight on unbundling of generation, grid related activities and supply and on the establishment of national regulators. However, these Directives focus more on common rules than on actual integration. The European Regulators' Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG) agreed in the spring of 2006 to launch an initiative to create seven regional energy markets in continental Europe as an interim step aimed to remove barriers for cross-border trade within those regions. Examples of regional markets in Europe are the Nordic market (Nord Pool), the Central Western European (CWE) market coupling, and the Iberian market between Spain and Portugal. The CWE region is now integrated with the Nordic region through a so-called Interim Tight Volume Coupling. Finally the connection of NorNed1 to the CWE market coupling in 12 January 2011 created an integrated day ahead market for 9 countries. Although these developments show that electricity markets in Europe are increasingly integrated, a corresponding integration of balancing markets has just begun. According to ERGEG (2009), lacking integration of balancing markets is a key impediment to the development of a single European market. Balancing markets are still highly concentrated in many countries and integration will increase competition and lower prices. In addition, increased production from wind and solar leads to more variable and less predictable generation patterns (IEA, 2009). This in turn will increase the need for balancing services that may become expensive and difficult to deliver by one country alone. Several entities have published reports, guidelines and position papers on cross border balancing. ETSO (2006) identifies the main challenges for cross-border trade of tertiary reserves being product compatibility, differences in price structure and differences in the procurement positions of the TSOs. The report identifies three technical models without explicit recommendations for any of these. ETSO (2007) states that the main drivers for regional integration processes are competition and efficiency. The need for harmonization is also identified. A reference model is defined and three different integration steps are described, respectively pooling of reserves, sharing of reserves and regional control. ERGEG (2009) addresses roles and responsibilities of stakeholders, cross border capacity, cross border procurement of reserve capacity, design aspects and transparency and monitoring. ACER's Framework Guidelines on Electricity Balancing (ACER, 2012) specifically address the roles and responsibilities of stakeholders involved in electricity balancing and the procurement of reserve capacity. Eurelectric, the Union of the Electricity Industry, a sector association which represents the common interests of the electricity industry at pan-European level, describes in Eurelectric (2008) the final structure of their preferred reserves and balancing market based on a number of core principles. The specific focus is on maintaining the traditionally high security of supply and the use of market based mechanisms and the role of the TSO. In its response to ACER (2012), Eurelectric emphasizes that “It is remarkably positive that the FG Balancing shows a clear preference for harmonisation, cost-effectiveness and cross-border trade, which EURELECTRIC strongly supports.” ENTSO-E (2011) aims at outlining this organization's initial views regarding cross-border balancing with focus on the TSOs' responsibility for the safe and secure operation of electricity transmission systems, maintaining security of supply and the need for a common target model. For cross-border exchanges of reserves, ENTSO-E recommends cross-border bilateral or multilateral reserve trading, while for cross border exchanges of balancing energy, ENTSO-E recommends a multilateral model without common merit order. The scientific literature on cross-border balancing is still relatively scarce. Madlener and Kaufmann (2002) state that on the European level, balancing markets have a potential to add liquidity to the wholesale electricity trade, without requiring additional infrastructure investments. Vandezande (2011) focuses both on the current national balancing markets in Europe and the multinational cross-border balancing markets. She suggests a proposal for appropriate national balancing marker design, ensuring both market based balancing services procurement and cost reflective real-time prices. She studies several market designs similar to those in the present paper. Also, Vandezande et al. (2009) show that cross-border balancing between the Netherlands and Belgium is an achievable goal that does not need unrealistic or elaborative efforts. Van der Veen et al. (2010) carry out a qualitative analysis for each arrangement based on the designated performance criteria for cross-border balancing. Jaehnert and Doorman (2010) describe a model of an integrated northern European balancing power market, including generation scheduling and unit commitment. Van der Veen et al., 2011a and Van der Veen et al., 2011b conduct an agent-based model to evaluate the effect of the main cross-border balancing arrangements. Abbasy et al. (2011) carry out an agent based simulation to study the potential effect of the BSP-TSO cross-border balancing arrangement between Norway and the Netherlands. In the present work we use a framework of design variables to describe the design space of first national (or single Control Area) balancing markets and subsequently cross-border balancing markets. The approach makes an explicit distinction between reserve capacity and balancing energy. Reserve capacity is secured by the TSOs to have access to power capacity for control purposes in their control area, while balancing energy is activated from the reserve capacity (or other available resources) by the TSOs in real time to maintain the balance within their control area (ENTSO-E, 2011). The contribution of this paper is three-fold. Firstly, we explicitly define a range of design variables for balancing markets. Although this has been done implicitly in other references, we believe that our explicit definitions enable more systematic analysis of specific proposals. Secondly, we define a number of different market designs based on the design variables. The design proposals are not new in all respects, but much more systematically described than in other work, showing the relevance of using the design variables. Thirdly, we define a set or performance criteria that we use to analyse the market design proposals. In Section 2 we will first present the design variables for balancing markets pertaining to one Control Area. Subsequently we present five central variables that determine the main design principles for multinational balancing markets. In Section 3 we combine these five design variables to define six different multinational balancing market designs. In Section 4 we define performance criteria for these designs, and finally in Section 5 we evaluate these designs using the performance criteria.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
In this paper we first present important design variables for balancing markets pertaining to one Control Area, which is the scope of most balancing markets today. Subsequently we present five central variables that determine the main design principles for multinational balancing markets. Combining these five design variables, we define six different multinational balancing market designs. Finally we evaluate these designs using a set of technical and economic performance criteria, coming to the following conclusions: • The designs with BSP-TSO trading reduce overall balancing market performance. Major causes for this result are a reduction of the effectiveness of the Balancing Energy and Reserve Capacity Markets, a reduction in balancing planning accuracy, a reduction in price efficiency because Balancing Service Providers must divide their resources between two markets and a decrease in dynamic efficiency. Although it is possible to mitigate the negative effects in various ways, there is a considerable danger of a negative overall impact. In the particular case of exchange between the Nordic and the CWE systems, this model may be relevant in a transitional period to create incentives for investment in AGC, which is presently not used in the Nordic system. • All other designs result in an overall improvement of balancing market performance. • The designs that include a Common Merit Order List come out with the highest values from the evaluation. The reservation of Cross Border Capacity in case of a Common Merit Order List for Reserve Capacity and Balancing Energy will increase effectiveness and price efficiency of the Reserve Capacity Market, but reduces efficiency of Cross Border Capacity allocation. The recommended balancing market integration process is a first step of introduction of imbalance netting, and then a large step to the introduction of the Common Merit Order List for Balancing Energy. However, the Additional Voluntary Pool as an intermediate design appears a favourable option, because ACE netting can be continued and a Common Merit Order List will take time to realize. Finally, it must be remarked in general that different initial balancing market designs and different power system and market conditions will influence this qualitative assessment of multinational balancing market designs. The large influence of the choice for reservation of Cross Border Capacity, the relative level of Balancing Energy prices and initial competitiveness in balancing service markets are important examples of this. Therefore, each specific balancing market integration project requires a dedicated analysis. However, the analyses strongly suggest that ACE netting and the Common Merit Order List for Balancing Energy are desirable, and that the latter is generally the most beneficial option, because of the positive effects on efficiency and effectiveness of Balancing Energy Markets.