پویش های اداره قراردادی و رابطه ای: شواهدی از تمهیدات تأمین تجهیزات دولتی و خصوصی در بلند مدت
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||تعداد صفحات مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی|
|16945||2008||12 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید|
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Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management, Volume 14, Issue 1, March 2008, Pages 43–54
This paper investigates the detail and dynamics of how contractual and relational governance mechanisms are deployed in managing complex, long-term public–private supply arrangements. Using empirical data from two UK Private Finance Initiative (PFI) cases, the paper analyses the interplay of governance mechanisms along a timeline of project phases. Conceptual and practical findings confirm that relational and contractual mechanisms are indeed complementary forms of exchange governance but also that the relational intentions of all parties frame whether the contract is interpreted as a written sign of distrust or commitment. Equally, relational and contractual governance follow different development paths: both follow cumulative trajectories but (a) inter-personal relational mechanisms are more incremental and fragile, whereas (b) contractual mechanisms move with fewer degrees of freedom and ‘anchor’ the exchange throughout the life cycle. Finally, the different development characteristics of relational and contractual mechanisms mean that their dynamic interplay does not follow consistent patterns. The paper concludes with suggestions for more longitudinal studies.
This paper contributes to a debate about the dynamics of inter-organisational governance. It explores the detail of contractual and relational governance mechanisms and their changing significance over time through an investigation of the management of long-term arrangements between public buyers and private service providers. Previous studies have suggested that contractual and relational governance need to be considered as complementary mechanisms ( Ferguson et al., 2005; Poppo and Zenger, 2002) but very little work has explored the details and dynamics of this interplay ( Klein Woolthuis et al., 2005). Specifically, this paper aims to develop a richer understanding of the detailed composition of these mechanisms and their contingent interplay over the life of an exchange relationship. This will contribute to better aggregate conceptualisation and theory building and generate more meaningful practical guidance. In order to access the phenomena two long-term supply arrangements have been investigated; both are UK Private Finance Initiative (PFI) design-build-finance-operate contracts with a 25- and 30-year lifespan, respectively. A key consideration in selecting PFI arrangements as the empirical focus of the research was the opportunity this provided to review specific supply arrangements over an extended period of time. In other words, the buyer–supplier ‘lock-in’ inherent in public–private partnership (PPP)/PFI actually makes it particularly useful for exploring exchange dynamics. The next section presents the conceptual background to different contractual and relational governance mechanisms and their interplay over time. Additionally, the specific governance challenges of public–private relationships are reviewed. The third and fourth sections describe the methodology and case findings. The final section presents the main conclusions and implications for future research.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
Before highlighting the key conclusions derived from analysis of the case material, it is important to reflect upon the work's limitations. Some are generic: this was an exploratory study and although established literature was used to frame the investigations, there was no formal hypothesis development or testing. Other limitations are more specific to the study. Although the PPP/PFI focus provided an empirical structure for the study, this remains a complex and controversial policy instrument and as such all opinions need to be seen through a potentially political lens. Equally, as supply markets and the policy itself have matured the ‘first wave’ projects that formed the subject of this research may be less representative of current practice. Accepting these limitations, conclusions with practical and theoretical implications emerged in three principal areas. First, the work confirms that relational and contractual mechanisms are indeed complementary forms of exchange governance but, more specifically, relational assumptions, experiences and intentions of all parties appear to actively frame whether the contract and contracting process is interpreted as a sign of distrust or a written manifestation of commitment. In managerial terms (for a PPP/PFI arrangement) there is evidence that contractual governance capability should be seen as a crucial but not sufficient ‘qualifier’ for effective exchange and therefore needs to act in combination with pro-active relational governance. Second, the trajectories of relational and contractual governance appear to have different characteristics. There is evidence that although relational governance based upon inter-personal trust follows an incremental, cumulative trajectory it is capable of being rapidly diminished. Contractual governance mechanisms are also incremental but cannot move with the same degree of freedom (i.e. once a complex contract is constructed it does not easily erode) and therefore ‘anchor’ the exchange throughout the life cycle. This also reflects the different drivers at work: contractual mechanisms—especially in PPP/PFI arrangements—are heavily constrained by exogenous regulatory factors, whereas relational governance is much more amenable to managerial control. In terms of managerial implications, certain techniques relating to the use of boundary spanners seem to be very effective in developing relational mechanisms. Finally, the different development characteristics of relational and contractual mechanisms mean that their dynamic interplay does not follow consistent patterns. Although extant literature (Poppo and Zenger, 2002) has already argued that contractual safeguards can support relationships in their earlier, more vulnerable phases (i.e. CTR=high/RELN=low) this longitudinal research has found evidence of the consistent stabilising effect of contractual, even complex contractual, governance—especially given the ongoing potential fragility of (inter-personal) relational mechanisms. In managerial terms, it may be worth reflecting on the positive aspects of ongoing contractual refinements: as a basis for building and re-building trust and in extended (PPP/PFI) supply arrangements where key staffs regularly move on, as a vehicle for capturing and retaining exchange-specific learning and knowledge.