جستجو، نمایندگی ها و قوانین و مقررات تجارت
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|17390||2001||15 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Review of Economic Dynamics, Volume 4, Issue 3, July 2001, Pages 680–694
I study a search-theoretic model with pairwise meetings where dealers arise endogenously. The extent of intermediation depends on its cost, trade frictions, and the dealers' ability to negotiate favorable terms of trade. Under Nash bargaining, there is a unique equilibrium where dealers buy and hold the low-storage-cost good and, depending on their relative bargaining power, resell it at a premium or a discount. The distribution of the terms of trade is nondegenerate unless storage cost and frictions vanish. Due to an externality created by intermediation, the efficient allocation can be achieved only if dealers can charge a positive markup.
I construct a search-theoretic environment that allows endogenous determination of the number of trade facilitators and the negotiated terms of trade. In it, mediated exchange emerges as a natural response to market frictions. I study how the incidence of intermediation responds to eco- nomic incentives linked to frictions, intermediation costs, the availability of different goods, and the ability to negotiate favorable terms of trade. 2 I also complement work on matching models of exchange by pointing to the implications of the absence or the type of pricing mechanism for existence