صندوق بین المللی پول و رشد اقتصادی: اثرات برنامه ها، وام ها و انطباق با شرطمندی
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|17482||2006||20 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : World Development, Volume 34, Issue 5, May 2006, Pages 769–788
In theory, the IMF could influence economic growth via several channels, among them being advice to policy makers, money disbursed under its programs, and its conditionality. This paper tries to separate those effects empirically. Using panel data for 98 countries over the period 1970–2000, it analyzes whether IMF involvement influences economic growth in program countries. Consistent with the results of previous studies, it is shown that IMF programs reduce growth rates when their endogeneity is accounted for. There is also evidence that compliance with conditionality mitigates this negative effect, while the overall impact, however, remains negative. IMF loans have no robust statistically significant impact.
The International Monetary Fund has come under increased scrutiny and attack, with some of the most intense criticisms targeting the link between its programs and reduced economic growth in borrower countries (e.g., Hutchison, 2003 and Przeworski and Vreeland, 2000). The channels by which the IMF could influence growth, however, have rarely been made explicit. In no study are those channels separated empirically. But how could IMF programs, which are designed to avoid growth-damaging policies, actually achieve the opposite? In theory, the IMF can influence economic outcomes by its money, the policy conditions it attaches to its loans and, more generally, its policy advice. The overall effect of the IMF on economic growth depends on the net effect of those channels. Nevertheless, the literature so far made no attempt to separate them. No study has taken compliance with conditionality adequately into account.1 As Joyce (2004, 12) put it: “This is a surprising omission, since presumably a country’s economic performance will vary in response to its implementation of the program’s policies. Assessing the performance of program countries without discriminating among them by their degree of compliance could give a misleading view of the effects of IMF programs. On the other hand, if no systematic linkages exist, then new questions arise about the effectiveness of Fund-supported policies and the need for conditionality.” This paper contributes to the literature in trying to separate the effects of programs, disbursed loans, and compliance with conditionality on economic growth. It analyzes whether implementation of IMF conditionality influences growth rates. The paper thus combines two strands of the literature on IMF programs: those on growth and those on compliance. What I find is, basically, that IMF programs reduce growth rates when accounting for self-selection into those programs. There is also evidence that compliance with conditionality mitigates this negative effect; IMF loans do not robustly affect economic growth. The next section summarizes what we know about the implementation of IMF conditions, the literature on the impact of the Fund on economic growth is shortly summarized thereafter. Section 4 discusses the various channels by which the IMF could influence economic growth; Section 5 describes the method and data employed. Section 6 presents the empirical analysis, while the final section concludes.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
“Our primary objective is growth” (Michael Camdessus, former IMF Managing Director, Statement before the United Nations Economic and Social Council in Geneva, July 11, 1990, cited in Przeworski & Vreeland, 2000). As has been shown in several studies, with respect to this objective, IMF programs are a failure. This paper provides further evidence. While supporting previous results on the negative relationship between IMF programs and economic growth, there is some evidence that compliance with IMF conditionality does increase growth rates once sample selection is taken into account. In any case, the effect of compliance is quantitatively small compared to the overall reduction. Since IMF loans and compliance are controlled for in the empirical analysis, the remaining negative impact of IMF programs might probably be due to either “bad” advice given by the IMF or the moral hazard it induces with its borrowers. To further separate the components reflected by the program participation variable remains an interesting area for future research. The results have implications for the design of conditionality. Whether or not the IMF should impose conditions on sovereign countries has been highly debated from the very beginning of the IMF’s operations.32 It has recently been shown that its conditions do not influence economic policy (Dreher & Vaubel, 2004b). The empirical results of this paper have shown that the impact of compliance with conditionality on growth is quantitatively small. As one interpretation of this result, conditions imposed by outside actors might be circumvented, even if the officially agreed criteria have been met. To some extent, the results of this paper support Dollar and Svensson (2000), who show that governments which are inclined to reform must be identified and cannot be created by international organizations. In order to lend more effectively, it would therefore be most important for the IMF to detect factors influencing ownership and thus the willingness to reform. Arguably, if the IMF would support reform-minded governments, its loans might make a difference (even if its advice might not). The results also allow a different interpretation. As claimed by the IMF, conditions are the outcome of a bargaining process between the government and the Fund.33 They might therefore reflect the government’s agenda instead of being imposed by the IMF. As a consequence, compliance with conditionality does not make a difference with respect to economic growth—the same policies would have been implemented without the Fund’s conditions. In any case, conditionality would not be necessary.