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|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|17492||2004||13 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||7314 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Research Policy, Volume 33, Issue 2, March 2004, Pages 257–269
The US Department of Defense (DOD) normally pursues a closed approach to technological development. It captures results from its own sponsored research and development (R&D), and the results are kept shielded by restrictions on related publications and exports. This R&D strategy is no longer viable. Now most military technology has commercial origins, the US no longer dominates all relevant technological fields, and sophisticated dual-use technology is accessible to adversaries in open global markets. DOD can address this dilemma by drawing on external R&D that tests a technology’s general capabilities against a variety of potential uses and by placing more of its internal emphasis on technology integration. Historically, this approach to military R&D also yields more commercial spin-offs.
Those who undertake to analyze the economic impact of the US military’s research and development (R&D) investments typically choose to take sides. They either make a list of commercial spin-offs, deriving the economic benefits to the United States of the de facto industrial policy operated by the US Department of Defense (DOD), or they illustrate the baroque character of US weapons technology and decry the diversion of productive resources to such obviously unproductive ends (Gold, 1990 and Reppy, 1999). In fact, both outcomes are evident in the historical record. Moreover, the analysis presented here indicates that these distinct outcomes are associated with two distinct approaches to organizing military research and development.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
Since the late-1970s, the US military’s adherence to the principles of shielded innovation for developing dual-use technology has not prevented superior, commercially derived versions of the same underlying technologies from reaching open global markets, where they quickly become accessible to allies and adversaries alike. Most defense technology, especially information technology, now has commercial roots, and these roots extend across the globe. It is simply impractical, if not impossible, to permanently prevent these dual-use technologies from diffusing to potential enemies. National security cannot be made to depend, therefore, on how well a system of export and publication controls maintains exclusive access to defense unique technology over time.