سیاست تحقیق و توسعه در یک اقتصاد ناپایدار
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|17516||2009||18 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||11452 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Volume 33, Issue 10, October 2009, Pages 1761–1778
The literature on R&D-based growth establishes that market equilibrium is inefficient and derives optimal R&D policy. Normative analyses of this type use the assumption of steady state, largely motivated by analytical convenience. This paper questions this steady-state approach by introducing endogenous cycles as long-run equilibria. We show that the government fails to maximize welfare if policy which is optimal in steady state is myopically applied in cyclical equilibria. More specifically, we demonstrate that (i) cycles arise in the (very) standard R&D-based model of Grossman and Helpman [1991. Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA (Chapter 3)] once the model is framed in discrete time, (ii) these cycles are inefficient in the sense that they prevent welfare maximization, (iii) optimal steady-state R&D policy fails to eliminate cycles, and can even create inefficient cycles, (iv) the application of R&D subsidies leads to a trade-off between growth and macroeconomic stability, and (v) optimal R&D policy in a fluctuating economy is state-dependent, which generalizes optimal steady-state R&D policy.
The literature on R&D-based growth establishes that market equilibrium is inefficient due to several types of market failures. When firms or individuals decide on the amount of resources allocated to their R&D activities, for example, they generally fail to consider how their research outcomes will improve future R&D productivity and benefit society as a whole. Effects of this type and others lead to under- or over-investment in R&D in the market economy. This calls for some kind of policy measure to improve overall welfare. An important aspect of this widely accepted result is that the normative analysis is conducted in steady state, a condition in which the resource allocation remains constant over time. This paper questions this steady-state approach of normative analysis by introducing the possibility of endogenous cycles as long-run equilibria.1 As a central thesis, the paper argues that policy implications derived in steady state lose relevance and can even be misleading to the restoration of Pareto efficiency in a fluctuating economy. In short, our study demonstrates an important qualification to the assumption of steady state, which is widely used in normative analysis without much consideration of its consequence on policy. Indeed, welfare cannot be maximized, if the rate of R&D subsidy, which would restore Pareto optimum in steady state, is myopically applied to a fluctuating economy. We establish that an optimal R&D policy in the presence of cycles must be contingent on the state of the economy. That is, the rate of R&D subsidy must alter in response to the number of R&D workers which change over cycles.