رفتارهای ارتباطی در روابط کانال بازاریابی: مفاهیم هزینه معاملات
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|17645||2007||10 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of Business Research, Volume 60, Issue 11, November 2007, Pages 1125–1134
Despite recent progress in research on marketing channel relationships, one important question remains unaddressed: Do distributor relational behaviors lower transaction cost for distributors? If so, how do relational behaviors affect transaction cost? This study examines the process through which relational behaviors affect transaction cost. Combining the relational perspective with the transaction cost analysis of exchange, the author develops hypotheses on the links between relational behaviors and transaction cost from a distributor's point of view: a distributor's relational behaviors have different direct and indirect effects on its transaction cost. The proposed hypotheses are tested on distributor–supplier relationships with data collected through a national survey of industrial distributors. The hypotheses on the dual, differential effects of relational behaviors on distributor transaction cost received partial empirical support.
What drives a distributor's superior exchange performance with its supplier? Various elements of performance metrics, including qualitative measures such as satisfaction (Geyskens et al., 1999) and commitment (Gruen et al., 2000) and quantitative measures such as transaction cost (Buvik and John, 2000), sales, and profit (Bello and Gilliland, 1997), have been examined. Market researchers also have identified firm-specific, dyadic, and extradyadic drivers of exchange performance (for studies on those drivers, see Bello andGilliland, 1997; Cannon and Perreault, 1999). Among the drivers of superior exchange performance, academic researchers (Jap, 1999) and practitioners (Fites, 1996) concur that engaging in relational behaviors is essential for garnering better exchange performance. Relational behaviors refer to activities that are specifically targeted to benefit a particular exchange relationship. Dyer and Singh (1998) maintain that relational rent as a supernormal profit from an interfirm exchange can only be earned and preserved through relational behaviors such as investing in relationship-specific assets and engaging in substantial knowledge exchange between two exchange parties (see also Jap, 1999). Generating economic rent is certainly desirable to exchange parties, and the benefits of relational behaviors are well established. However, can the benefits of relational behaviors be reaped without incurring cost? Consider the issue of investing in relationship-specific assets. Although recent studies recognize that relation-specific assets help firms reduce cost and achieve product differentiations (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997; Stump and Heide, 1996), many previous studies, using transaction cost analysis logic, have highlighted vulnerability to exploitation by the exchange partner (cf. Bensaou and Anderson, 1999). Therefore, relational behaviors, including investment in relationshipspecific assets, appear to engender both cost and benefits to a party that engages in such behaviors. Yet extant literature has not been clear about the dual effects of relational behaviors and their net value for exchange performance (Rokkan et al., 2003). Instead, either the costly aspects (Heide and John, 1988) or the