کلاهبرداری مزایده اینترنتی و انگلی:یک اکتشاف
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|17705||2008||31 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||14704 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Information and Organization, Volume 18, Issue 4, October 2008, Pages 303–333
Most research on Internet auction fraud focuses exclusively on the relationship between the con-artist and victim. However, the con-artist and victim are situated in an ecology comprising the auction house, police, and auction community. This paper employs the ‘parasite’ metaphor as a way of building theory about Internet auction fraud. We begin by describing the parasite metaphor. We then introduce three theories from the parasitism literature and demonstrate the insights these theories can produce. The first theory, the competitive exclusion principle, highlights how separate auction markets evolve their own species or types of fraud. It also warns us that fraud elimination may be neither desirable nor feasible relative to constraining fraud to acceptable levels. The second theory details various parasite infection mechanisms to show that on-line fraud is composed of two processes; the actual deception and escape. Finally, virulence theory provides one way to predict how much harm a particular kind of fraud will cause to an individual victim. Virulence theory is also used to suggest that the auction infrastructure encourages low virulence vis-à-vis other kinds of fraud like Nigerian letter fraud.
Internet auctions are among the most celebrated and successful new business models of the emerging knowledge economy (Kambil & Heck, 2002). eBay, the largest Internet auction house, has experienced exponential growth in customers, number of items sold, and gross merchandise sales since its incorporation in 1996 (eBay Inc, 2005). However, the rise of Internet auctions has also led to the rise of Internet auction fraud. Internet auction fraud is the most pervasive form of Internet fraud (National Fraud Information Center, 2007 and National White Collar Crime Center, & Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2005). Indeed, Internet auction fraud has literally grown in lockstep with the growth of Internet auction markets. Fig. 1 charts this relationship, cross-indexing three measures of growth in the (by far) largest Internet auction site against the only systematically collected statistics on Internet auction fraud. The correlation between these measures of growth and auction fraud range from 0.89 (items sold vs. auction fraud) to 0.94 (no. customers vs. auction fraud). Full-size image (58 K) Fig. 1. Growth in eBay transactions and fraud. (a) Growth in customers per year – eBay. (b) Items sold per year – eBay. (c) Gross merchandise sales per year – eBay. (d) Fraud complaints to the IFCC/IC3. (The IFCC/IC3 was formed in mid-2000. Formal statistics for the period before this are unavailable.) Figure options That Internet auction fraud is so prevalent is worrisome, especially as Internet auctions rely to a great extent on trust. While existing work has highlighted some important concerns about Internet auction fraud, the problem largely remains unsolved. Novel perspectives are therefore warranted to challenge and refine existing theory. This paper explores the use of the biological parasite as a metaphor for Internet auction fraud. In using the metaphor, we draw upon three theories of parasitism: (1) competitive exclusion, (2) parasite invasion mechanisms, and (3) virulence theory. We explore how each of these theories offers novel insights into auction fraud that are consistent with existing evidence. We contribute to the literature in two main ways. First, we introduce parasitism as a metaphor. We argue that the metaphor sensitizes the researcher to a number of phenomena in Internet auction fraud that researchers have heretofore ignored. For example, we demonstrate that fraud is indicative of a healthy market. Second, we introduce three theories from the parasitism literature and demonstrate their utility in Internet auction fraud. The competitive exclusion principle suggests that fraud in separate auction markets can take distinct forms. This consequently implies that managing fraud requires a more nuanced approach than simple prosecution. The theory of parasitical infection mechanisms reveals that deception involves not only trickery, but escape. Finally, virulence theory is used to demonstrate natural, self-governing bounds on the amount of damage Internet auction fraud con-artists typically do. The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews existing research on Internet auction fraud. Section 3 then discusses the potential usefulness of ecological views to the Internet auction fraud problem. Section 4 adapts the views of Section 3 to introduce the parasite metaphor. Section 5 presents our research methodology, the results of which are presented in Section 6. Section 7 concludes the work and discusses limitations.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
Previous research on Internet auction fraud relies principally on economic and legal analysis. While such research has shed important light on the Internet auction fraud phenomenon, it does not consider many important issues. In this paper, we introduced the ‘parasite’ metaphor as an analytical lens for viewing Internet auction fraud in an effort to expand our understanding of the phenomena. We demonstrated that using this lens revealed much about how Internet auction fraud works. Table 5 summarizes the contributions. Table 5. Contributions of parasite metaphor Aspect Contribution General Fraud is the normal state of affairs. The absence of fraud suggests anomalies in market function The deceptive nature of fraud means that single sources of evidence are unlikely to reveal much about the nature of fraud Fraud must be understood within the context of the market it inhabits. Something lawful in one market may be fraudulent in another Residence/competitive exclusion Market conditions determine which kinds of fraud thrive Anti-fraud policy should focus on managing fraud rather than eliminating it. Education is more important than policing Dependence/parasite infection Deception involves not only tricking the victim, but devising an opportunity for escape. Mechanisms for escape are different from trickery Harm/virulence theory Fraud will never cause market collapse, because the size of the market provides an upper bound to the amount of possible harm a con-artist will inflict Nature of payment systems/victim/market influences the amount that can be obtained via a successful fraud Table options We began by identifying three key characteristics of parasites, specifically that the parasite must: (1) reside in or on the host, (2) be dependent on the host, and (3) harm the host. We defined the parasite’s host as the Internet auction system. We then differentiated our use of ‘parasite’ from the casual metaphor employed in everyday use. Specifically, we distinguished between harm to the host, and harm to the organizational ecology, and emphasized the pejorative bias of considering parasites as inferior species. We demonstrated the parasite metaphor’s ability to shed new light on the fraud phenomenon by applying three theories of biological parasites to auction fraud, each theory mapping to one of the three aspects of the definition of parasites. The competitive exclusion principle mapped to residence, parasite infection mechanisms mapped to dependence, and virulence theory mapped to harm to the host. The competitive exclusion principle highlights the unique characteristics of separate markets and fraud types, suggesting that findings in one market may not be generalizable to others. It also warns us that eradicating some types of fraud may cause more harm than good. Fraud exists because there are strong incentives for individuals to commit fraud. When we eliminate one kind of fraud without eliminating the incentives, another more virulent form of fraud could emerge in its place. Conversely, education and behavior modifications may be a better way of managing fraud. The literature on parasite infection mechanisms further reinforces the idea that fraud evolves to fill an ecological niche by highlighting the diversity of auction fraud types (i.e., species). In doing so, it deepens our understanding of what deception is. Deception involves not only tricking the victim, but also a strategy for escaping from repercussions. Finally, virulence theory provides a formal way to study the relationship between the amount of harm the con-artist does and the nature of the market the con-artist inhabits. One insight from virulence theory is that con-artists are more likely to appear in successful than unsuccessful markets, and the prevalence of con-artists in auction markets is associated with their overall health and success. A second insight is that the way the market operates will have an influence on how much harm a victim suffers. Evidence from the limited, systematically collected data across fraud markets supports this insight.