دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی شماره 17874 + ترجمه فارسی
عنوان فارسی مقاله

ریسک شکایت های قانونی، کیفیت حسابداری و بازده سرمایه گذاری

کد مقاله سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی ترجمه فارسی
17874 2013 6 صفحه PDF 24 صفحه WORD
خرید مقاله
پس از پرداخت، فوراً می توانید مقاله را دانلود فرمایید.
عنوان انگلیسی
Litigation risk, accounting quality, and investment efficiency
منبع

Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)

Journal : Advances in Accounting, Volume 29, Issue 2, December 2013, Pages 180–185

فهرست مطالب ترجمه فارسی
چکیده
مقدمه
پژوهش های مرتبط و فرضیه سازی
D & O بیمه مسئولیت قانونی
ریسک شکایت های قانونی، کیفیت حسابداری، و بازده سرمایه
خطرات دادخواهی و کیفیت حسابداری
نمونه گیری و طرح پژوهش
روش پژوهش
یافته های تجربی
کلمات کلیدی
بیمه مسئولیت مدیران و افسران '( & ) - ریسک شکایت های قانونی - کیفیت تعهدات - بازده سرمایه گذاری - حساسیت جریان نقدی سرمایه گذاری - ' & ' (&) -
ترجمه چکیده
این مقاله به بررسی اثر تعدیل ریسک شکایت های قانونی بر رابطه بین کیفیت حسابداری و بازده سرمایه گذاری می پردازد. ما از مدیران و متصدیان '(D & O) بیمه مسئولیت به عنوان نماینده برای ریسک شکایت های قانونی، کیفیت اقلام تعهدی برای کیفیت حسابداری و سرمایه گذاری حساسیت جریان نقدی برای بهره وری سرمایه گذاری (بیدل و هیلاری، 2006؛ Hovakimian و Hovakimian، 2009) استفاده کردیم. با استفاده از داده های 1998 تا 2008 کانادا، ما نشان دادیم که شرکت های با پوشش D & O اقلام تعهدی بالاتر با کیفیت پایین تر را نشان می دهند. علاوه بر این، پیش از این اسناد ارتباط منفی بین کیفیت اقلام تعهدی و سرمایه گذاری نقدی حساسیت قوی تر (ضعیف تر) است در حالی که پوشش نامعمول D & O پایین تر(بالا)، نشان می دهد که نقش کیفیت حسابداری در بهره وری تسهیل سرمایه گذاری مشروط به ریسک شکایت های قانونی قابل مشاهده است.
ترجمه مقدمه
این مقاله به بررسی اثر تعیین کننده ریسک شکایت های قانونی بر رابطه بین کیفیت حسابداری و بازده سرمایه گذاری می پردازد. ریسک شکایت های قانونی کاهش مشکلات نمایندگی و ترویج کیفیت بیشتر در حسابداری را موجب می شود؛ و کیفیت بیشتر حسابداری، به نوبه خود، موجب افزایش سرمایه بهره وری تخصیص می گردد (بیدل و هیلاری، 2006). بر این اساس، عواملی که ممکن است خطر شکایت های قانونی را کاهش دهد می تواند اثر بازدارنده از ریسک شکایت های قانونی را تضعیف می کند
پیش نمایش مقاله
پیش نمایش مقاله ریسک شکایت های قانونی، کیفیت حسابداری و بازده سرمایه گذاری

چکیده انگلیسی

This paper examines the moderating effect of litigation risk on the relationship between accounting quality and investment efficiency. We use directors’ and officers’ (D&O) liability insurance as a proxy for litigation risk, accruals quality for accounting quality, and investment cash flow sensitivity for investment efficiency (Biddle & Hilary, 2006; Hovakimian & Hovakimian, 2009). Using Canadian data from 1998 to 2008, we show that firms with higher D&O insurance coverage exhibit lower quality accruals. Moreover, the previously documented negative association between accruals quality and investment cash flow sensitivity is stronger (weaker) when abnormal D&O coverage is low (high), suggesting that the role of accounting quality in facilitating investment efficiency is conditional upon observable litigation risk.

مقدمه انگلیسی

This paper examines the effect of a determinant of litigation risk on the relationship between accounting quality and investment efficiency. Litigation risk mitigates agency problems and promotes greater accounting quality; and greater accounting quality, in turn, enhances capital allocation efficiency (Biddle & Hilary, 2006). Accordingly, factors that might reduce litigation risk can undermine the deterrent effect of litigation risk, inducing opportunistic behaviors by managers, reducing accounting quality and investment efficiency. We argue that directors’ and officers’ (D&O) liability insurance reduces litigation risk, and we examine the association of D&O insurance, accounting quality, and investment efficiency. We exploit a unique institutional setting in Canada, where firms are required to disclose D&O insurance information. We use disclosed D&O coverage limits to measure litigation risk and posit that managers and directors with high abnormal coverage limits face low litigation risk. Under these observable conditions we hypothesize that the relationship between accounting quality and investment efficiency is altered. Consistent with extant evidence, we confirm a negative association between abnormal D&O coverage limits and accruals quality. Moreover, we find that the documented negative association between accounting quality and investment cash flow sensitivity is weaker when abnormal D&O insurance coverage limit is high. Overall, our findings suggest that litigation risk is an important governance mechanism that ensures the quality of accounting information and improves capital allocation efficiency by reinforcing the role of accruals in investment financing decisions. Our findings are robust to alternative measures of accounting quality and investment efficiency. Our research contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, we extend prior research on accruals quality and investment efficiency by documenting that observable risk exposure moderates the association between accounting quality and investment efficiency. Our results highlight the importance of litigation risk in ensuring the quality of accounting information and promoting investment efficiency. Second, we provide evidence on the effects of litigation risk on accruals quality. Prior studies use accounting restatements or earnings conservatism as a proxy for accounting information quality or exploit cross-country differences in legal institutions (Burgstahler et al., 2006, Chung and Wynn, 2008, Kim, 2005, Leuz et al., 2003 and Lin et al., 2013). Our firm-level evidence further underscores the importance of litigation risk even in an environment with a high level of investor protection, such as in Canada. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide the literature review and the hypothesis development. Section 3 presents the sample selection and describes the research design. Section 4 discusses empirical findings, and Section 5 provides the results of robustness checks. Finally, Section 6 offers concluding remarks.

نتیجه گیری انگلیسی

Using D&O insurance coverage limits of Canadian firms over the period ranging from 1998 to 2008, we provide evidence that (i) observable litigation risk (as measured by abnormal D&O coverage limits) is associated with accruals quality, and (ii) observable litigation risk moderates the facilitating role of accruals quality on investment efficiency. In particular, firms with high abnormal D&O coverage are more likely to provide lower quality accruals, with the effect of a diminished role for accounting quality in promoting investment efficiency. These findings are robust to alternative measures of accruals quality and investment efficiency. This study contributes to the literature by providing firm-level evidence on the effects of litigation risk on accounting quality and investment decisions. Our firm-level evidence further underscores the importance of litigation risk even in an environment with a relatively high level of investor protection, such as in Canada. Moreover, we extend prior research on the association between accruals quality and investment efficiency by reporting that observable litigation risk moderates the association. Our results highlight the importance of litigation risk as a governance mechanism to ensure the quality of accounting information and improve capital allocation efficiency, independently as well as jointly, by reinforcing the role of accounting information in investment decisions.

خرید مقاله
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