منابع مزرعه، هزینه های معاملات و ادغام رو به جلو در بخش کشاورزی: شواهد از تولید شراب فرانسوی
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|17948||2011||9 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Food Policy, Volume 36, Issue 6, December 2011, Pages 839–847
This research aims to understand why French wine producers venture into direct sale to customers instead of selling bulk wine to wine companies. The empirical tests on the French Farm Census confirm the value of both Resource-Based Perspective and Transaction Cost Economics in understanding organizational choices in agriculture and food markets. Because asset specificity in wine trade is low on average, large wine producers have an advantage over smaller ones and so are more likely to venture into direct sale of generic wines. By contrast smaller wine producers are more likely to rely on the bulk wine market, which is less risky for them. In addition our model helps us to understand the effect of the State-sponsored certification of grape and wine quality, the Protected Designation of Origin system. All other things being equal, producers with vineyards of high reputation (PDO) are also more likely to bottle and sell their wines; we guess this is because they wish to capture the value of the PDO reputation, the collective brand name capital owned by the farmers. Finally, saving on transaction cost is only one side of the coin: the most educated wine producers can profitably reinvest their knowledge and capabilities into new activities. These choices have important consequence on the French Wine Supply Chain governance.
The economic literature on vertical integration in food chains mostly concerns processing firms (Ménard and Klein, 2004, Reimer, 2006 and Raynolds, 2004). Research on this topic in the agricultural sector has been very limited to date (Battershill and Gilg, 1998, Kirwan, 2006 and Summer and Wolf, 2002). In contrast, the broader topic of farm household pluri-activity – i.e. the generation of income additional to that from primary agriculture by any member of the household – a horizontal extension, has been widely studied by rural scholars in OECD and developing countries (See special issues in Fuller, 1990, Barrett et al., 2001 and Otsuka and Yamano, 2006).
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
This research aims to analyze the main factors in farmers’ forward integration into wine trading. We suggest a causal model in reference to Resource-Based Perspective and Transaction Cost Economics. Empirical testing on the last French Farm Censuses confirms the value of this theoretical framework in understanding organizational choices in food supply chains. It allows us to question the specificity of farm assets in this sector. Because asset specificity in the wine trade is low on average, large wine producers have an advantage over smaller farms. Statistically they are more likely to venture into trade for generic wines. In addition the model provides an understanding of the effect of the Protected Designation of Origin system, a semi-public certification of grape and wine production. Ceteris paribus, producers with vineyards of prestigious origin (PDO) are also more likely to bottle and sell their wines; we guess this is because the PDO reputation and the collective brand name capital, the fruits of farmer investments in quality, should be protected. As the bulk wine market is less risky for diversified growers, they are more likely to rely on the “market”. Ultimately, saving on transaction costs is only one side of the coin: we have seen that the most educated wine producers are reinvesting their skills and knowledge in new professional activities. Wine producers willing to preserve the pay-off of the reputation of their Geographical Indication and of particular investments in quality are therefore more likely to go onto the final market to sell wine directly to retailers. These strategic choices have important consequence on governance of the French wine supply chain. The reason adduced for such a pattern is not simply to restore efficiency. It also seems to be a choice for better control by the farmers over the PDO label. Our initial results pave the way to more complete analyses on the organization of European wine marketing. Our contribution has some limitations that merit further research. The empirical testing of some theoretical concepts and hypotheses raises major methodological problems, the difficulty of evaluating asset specificity from governmental surveys or census data and the limit of the structural data to understand strategies. Investigations on strategic motivations may constitute an interesting extension of this analysis. Future studies could devote attention to the importance of the farmers’ strategic behaviors considering their perception of the middleman pattern and not only considering the farmer’s resources.