هزینه بی ثباتی سیستم بانکداری: برخی شواهد تجربی
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|18236||2002||31 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of Banking & Finance, Volume 26, Issue 5, May 2002, Pages 825–855
This paper assesses the cross country `stylised facts' on empirical measures of the losses incurred during periods of banking crises. We first consider the direct resolution costs to the government and then the broader costs to the welfare of the economy – proxied by losses in GDP. We find that the cumulative output losses incurred during crisis periods are large, roughly 15–20%, on average, of annual GDP. In contrast to previous research, we also find that output losses incurred during crises in developed countries are as high, or higher, on average, than those in emerging-market economies. Moreover, output losses during crisis periods in developed countries also appear to be significantly larger – 10–15% – than in neighbouring countries that did not at the time experience severe banking problems. In emerging-market economies, by contrast, banking crises appear to be costly only when accompanied by a currency crisis. These results seem robust to allowing for macroeconomic conditions at the outset of crisis – in particular low and declining output growth – that have also contributed to future output losses during crises episodes.
Over the past quarter of a century, unlike the preceding twenty five years, there have been many banking crises around the world. Caprio and Klingebiel, 1996 and Caprio and Klingebiel, 1999, for example, document 69 crises in developed and emerging-market countries since the late 1970s. In a recent historical study of 21 countries, Bordo et al. (2001) report only one banking crisis in the quarter of a century after 1945 but 19 since then. Although there is now a substantial cross country empirical literature on the causes of banking crises,1 there have been fewer studies measuring the potential costs of financial system instability. Yet it is a desire to avoid such costs that lies behind policies designed to prevent, or manage, crises. This paper considers the ways in which banking crises can impose costs on the broader economy and presents estimates of those costs. In particular, the paper focuses on cross-country estimates of the direct fiscal costs of crisis resolution and the broader welfare costs, approximated by output losses, associated with banking crises. The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 considers the various potential costs of banking crises and provides a brief overview of the channels through which they are incurred. Section 3 discusses briefly the general issues involved in measuring the costs of crises. Section 4 assesses the existing evidence on the fiscal costs of crisis resolution, and Section 5 presents a number of estimates of output foregone during crisis periods. Section 6 assesses the extent to which output losses are attributable to banking crises per se rather than due to other causes. Section 7 concludes.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
Theoretical studies and empirical work focussing on particular crises suggest that under certain conditions banking crises can impose large costs on an economy. Cross-country estimates of fiscal and output costs (both as a share of GDP) reported in this paper appear to bear this out. The costs of banking crises are often measured in terms of their effect on fiscal expenditure. Cross-country estimates of fiscal resolution costs of banking crises tend to be bigger in lower income countries and those with higher degrees of banking intermediation. Countries with large fiscal costs of crisis have in the past often experienced a simultaneous currency crisis, especially those that had in place a fixed exchange rate regime. However, resolution costs may simply reflect a transfer of income from taxpayers to bank “stakeholders” rather than necessarily the cost to the economy as a whole. A different, albeit still imperfect, proxy for the latter is the impact of crises on output. However, a crucial issue in measuring output losses is deciding whether they are caused by the banking crises, and are thus costs of banking crises, or whether recession caused the crises. The output losses associated with crises are usually measured as the cumulative difference in output, or output growth, during the crisis period from its pre-crisis trend.26 Although varying markedly from crisis to crisis, our cross-country estimates of output losses during banking crises are, on average, large – around 15–20% of annual GDP. Output losses are usually much larger in the event of a twin banking/currency crisis than if there is a BC alone, particularly in emerging-market countries. Causation here is likely to run in both directions with larger banking crises causing currency runs which, in turn, may exacerbate banking problems, especially for banking systems with large net foreign currency liabilities. Crises have also typically lasted longer in developed countries than in emerging markets. Because of this, on some measures output losses during crises are larger in developed than in emerging-market countries. One possible explanation of this is that emerging-market economies must respond more quickly during banking crises because they usually incur much more widespread bad loan problems than developed countries. Using a cross-sectional rather than time series approach, we have compared output losses in a sample of systemic banking crises with neighbouring countries that did not at the time face severe banking problems. We found that banking crises but not currency crises significantly affect output in developed countries, while the opposite was true in emerging-market countries. These results also seem to hold up after allowing for other factors that may have caused output to fall. However, there remains the possibility of reverse causation, with larger recessions causing banking (or currency) crises rather than crises causing bigger recessions. Since there are large differences in estimated output losses from crisis to crisis, a potential fruitful avenue for future research is to explain these differences. In particular, from a public policy perspective, it would be useful to better understand what type of resolution measures are most successful in minimising the welfare costs of crises. Summarising, it seems to be the case that regardless of whether banking crises cause or are produced by recession, they exacerbate subsequent output losses (and are often costly to resolve).