منابع رشد اقتصادی چین 1952-1999: ترکیب انباشت سرمایه انسانی
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|18413||2003||21 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : China Economic Review, Volume 14, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 32–52
China's economic growth has been remarkable since the reform started in 1978. There is an ongoing debate about whether this performance is driven mainly by productivity growth or by factor accumulation. But few past studies taken human capital into account, and thus contained an omission bias. In this paper, we construct a measure of China's human capital stock over 1952–1999 and employ it in our growth accounting exercise. We find that, first, in China, the accumulation of human capital was quite rapid and it contributed significantly to growth and welfare; second, after incorporating human capital, the growth of total factor productivity (TFP) still played a positive role in GDP growth in the reform period, while it was negative in the prereform period. These results are robust changes in labor shares in GDP and in depreciation rates. An implication is that a high priority should be given to human capital accumulation and productivity growth, if China is to sustain its growth and welfare improvement in the next decade.
Few would argue about China's extraordinary growth performance since reforms started in 1978, but the sources of the growth have been the subject of a heated debate. This paper contributes to this debate by investigating the determinants of China's growth over 1952–1999 using a simple growth-accounting framework that incorporates human capital stock. By constructing a measure of human capital stock and comparing the growth experiences of the prereform and reform periods, we try to shed light on the relative importance of factor accumulation (physical capital, labor, and human capital) and the growth of total factor productivity (TFP). The ongoing debate focuses on whether China's rapid growth during the reform period is driven mainly by productivity growth or by factor accumulation. On one side, many researchers conclude that productivity growth has played a significant role (for example, Chow, 1993, Borensztein & Ostry, 1996 and Hu & Khan, 1997). In particular, Chow contends that capital formation played a principal role in China's economic growth, while there was nearly no technological progress from 1952 to 1980. The other two growth-accounting studies cited above find that, during the reform period after 1978, the role of capital accumulation was only secondary, with productivity growth becoming the primary driving force of China's rapid economic growth. For example, Borensztein and Ostry (1996) conclude that the growth rate of TFP, which was negative before reform, rose to 3.8% per year in the postreform period, accounting for more than one-third of the total increase in output. On the other side, Krugman (1994) argues that China will face a limit on growth sooner or later, since it depends heavily on a massive increase in input with only small improvement in productivity, as in the case of East Asian economies. Moreover, Young (2000), claims that the productivity performance of China's nonagricultural sector during the reform period is, while respectable, not outstanding. More specifically, he finds that systematic understatement of inflation by enterprises accounts for 2.5 percentage points of growth per annum in the nonagricultural sector during the reform period (1978–1998). The usual suspects—rising participation rates, improvements in educational attainment, and the transfer of labor out of agriculture—account for most of the remainder. As such, it is possible to recast the recent growth experience of China from the extraordinary to the mundane. In this paper, we construct a new time series of China's stock of human capital and use it in our growth accounting exercise. The studies by Borensztein and Ostry (1996), Chow (1993), and Hu and Khan (1997) do not incorporate human capital as an input in their aggregate production function for the Chinese economy. Thus, their measurement of productivity growth suffers from an omission bias and the estimated productivity as residual is exaggerated. Further, our approach to constructing the human capital stock is different from that of other studies that have constructed such a series. In particular, our series covers a longer period than the previous studies and uses a different flow variable. Our data set on educational attainment provides annual measures of the human capital stock for the Chinese economy for the prereform period 1952–1977 and the reform period 1978–1999. The flow variable we used is the number of graduates completing different schooling levels, rather than enrollment figures at 5-year intervals. Young's (2000) estimation of human capital growth has several shortcomings: He disaggregates the labor force into various categories based on the infrequent population census data. In addition, he weights each type of workers by the wage of that type, using the Household Survey files covering a smaller period (1986–1992) than his analysis period (1978–1998). Therefore, the human capital growth he obtains is not an annual growth rate and may have out-of-sample bias in the aggregate human capital stock series. We find that, first, the accumulation of human capital was quite rapid and it contributed significantly to growth and welfare. Second, even with human capital being incorporated, the growth of TFP still played a positive and significant role during the reform period 1978–1999, in contrast to the negative productivity growth during the prereform period 1952–1977. That is, in the ongoing sources-of-growth debate, this paper shows that both productivity growth and factor accumulation are significant in contributing to China's growth performance during the reform period. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly introduces the growth accounting method. Section 3 is devoted to the data and measurement issues. Section 4 details how we construct the human capital stock series. Section 5 looks at the share of labor in national income. Section 6 discusses the results of growth accounting and provides some sensitivity analyses. Section 7 provides a summary and policy implications.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
This paper revisits the important issue of sources of China's economic growth. The fundamental debate is over the relative importance of factor accumulation and TFP growth as sources for output growth. By incorporating a measure of human capital stock in the production function, we reevaluate the relative contribution of factors of production to the aggregate growth. We find that first, the accumulation of human capital in China, as measured by the average years of schooling in population aged 15–64 years, was quite rapid and it contributed significantly to growth and welfare. However, the rate of growth of human capital declined in the reform period in 1978–1999 and its contribution to GDP growth was smaller compared to the prereform period. Second, with human capital being incorporated, the growth of TFP contributed positively to output growth in the reform period, accounting for 25.4% of growth in 1978–1999. The contribution of TFP growth was consistently negative for prereform period and positive for reform period in our sensitivity analysis. However, the TFP growth for the entire period of 1953–1999 is nearly zero, with physical capital accumulation accounting for 51% of growth, and TFP growth accounting for only 0.2%. This result is robust with respect to alternative assumptions regarding depreciation rates of physical capital and factor income shares. It is beyond the scope of this study to assess China's growth prospects in the coming decade, but a few implications may be drawn from our results. First, because of the rapid expansion of the capital base, the relative importance of factor accumulation may be declining (the law of diminishing returns). In the industrial countries, the contributions to growth by the factor input have declined and the growth of TFP has become the driving force. In China, the potential to further increase factor inputs is limited especially after one considers the rapidly aging population, a declining labor force in the future,18 and the constraints in natural resources. China has to rely more on productivity growth. Second, the TFP growth in the past could be attributed to China's integration with the global economy and efficiency gains from market-oriented reforms. Many of the “easy” reforms have been implemented and the initial efficiency gains have been obtained. The next stage of growth may require more painful reforms. Moreover, efficiency gains due to reform are often one-shot gains and will eventually level off. The past TFP growth may have been in the nature of a catch-up, with the help of imitation-based technological progress. Further productivity growth would depend very much on two factors: (1) whether or not China can improve allocative efficiency by continuing reforms in the state and financial sectors and by increasing regional integration, allowing freer factor mobility across sectoral divides, such as rural–urban and state–nonstate, and (2) whether or not China is able to transform itself from an imitation-based economy to an innovation-based knowledge economy and continue its progress in industrial upgrading. Third, investing in human capital has immense potential in contributing to productivity growth and welfare.19 However, the lower growth rate of human capital accumulation during the reform period is a matter for concern, especially considering China's need for building an innovation-based knowledge economy. Funding for basic education is unevenly distributed and insufficient in many poorer regions.20 Government spending on education as a ratio of GDP has been stagnating since 1984. Although private financing is rising in the cities, its availability is not distributed evenly. The distribution of educational funding is more skewed if the availability of private financing is taken into account. Therefore, China needs to address its insufficient and uneven distribution of educational investment urgently, if China is to sustain its growth and welfare improvement in the next decade.