تجارت و توزیع سرمایه انسانی
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|18555||2007||13 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||6180 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of International Economics, Volume 73, Issue 2, November 2007, Pages 421–433
We develop a two-country, two-sector model of trade where the only difference between the two countries is their distribution of human capital endowments. We show that even if the two countries have identical aggregate human capital endowments the pattern of trade depends on the properties of the two human capital distributions. We also show that the two distributions of endowments also completely determine the effects of trade on income inequality. We also look at a simple majority voting model. It turns out autarky and free trade with and without compensation may be the voting outcome.
The impact of trade on income inequality has been a topic widely discussed in both academic and policy forums. What has triggered interest in this topic is a growing concern among industrialized nations about their ability to sustain high standards of wellbeing in the face of competition from low wage countries. These issues have been addressed theoretically by models in which trade occurs because of differences in technologies and endowments.2 However, it has also been noted that a large volume of international trade takes place between rich countries and they have similar technologies and endowments.3 In order to address these issues in a way that accounts for these facts we develop a two-country, two-sector model of trade where the only difference between the two countries is in their distribution of human capital endowments. 4 Their technological capabilities and the preferences of their consumers are identical. 5 In each country there is a primary sector where output is produced using labor and a high-tech sector that uses human capital as its input. We will demonstrate that even if the two countries have identical aggregate human capital endowments they will trade with the patterns of trade depending on the properties of the two human capital distributions. 6 We will also show that together, the two distributions of endowments also completely determine the effects of trade on income inequality. More specifically, we will find that inequality always rises in the country that exports the high-tech product and declines in the country that exports the primary commodity. Next, we explore the welfare implications of our model. We compare total welfare under autarky with the corresponding welfare under free trade and find that, unless the marginal utility of income is constant, there exist free-trade equilibria that are welfare reducing. If we allow income redistribution, then there are always long-term gains from trade for each member of society as long as losers are compensated.7 Finally, we ask what outcome would emerge in a simple majority voting framework. We find that in the absence of redistribution, autarky or free trade could be the equilibrium choice of a majority of the population. There is also an equilibrium in which free trade is chosen but overall welfare declines. In that case, free trade is preferred by the majority but the losses of the losers outweigh the gains of the winners. If, in addition to voting on free trade, we also allow voters to vote on whether there should be income redistribution that ensures no member of society loses from trade, then autarky can never be an equilibrium. However, there still is an equilibrium in which free trade is chosen, redistribution fails to be approved and overall welfare declines. We begin by developing the model.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
In this paper, we have assumed that the distribution of human capital is exogenous. One obvious extension would be to allow for endogenous accumulation of skills. This can be accomplished by considering an economy in which 2-period lived agents spend their first period of their lives investing in skill accumulation while during the second period produce, trade and consume. In such a model, the agents' investment in skills will depend on their expectations about both government policies and the trade regime. Because of the associated costs with skill accumulation, underemployment of human capital becomes a much more serious issue. There are two types of government policies that would be worthwhile to consider; namely redistribution policies and educational subsidies. There is a growing literature that examines issues related to the relationship between skill accumulation and income inequality but the majority of the work in this area has ignored government policies. Two exceptions are Deardoff (1997) and Janeba (2000). However both papers focus on the optimality of government policies ignoring their potential implementation in systems where decisions are not taken by a social planner but rely on a majority rule. Another possible extension is to consider the problem that governments face when they decide how to allocate a fixed budget for investments in human capital accumulation. In this case government policies completely determine the distribution of human capital (there is no initial distribution to begin with) which in turn will determine the patterns of trade and post-trade income distribution. A third extension would be to apply our model to immigration issues. As it stands our model cannot explain immigration because we obtain factor price equalization.13 However, by adding a third factor, say physical capital, that is complimentary to human capital factor price equalization might fail. Our analysis suggests that immigration or emigration of agents will affect both welfare and income distribution.