اثر محدود انتشار تجارت اتحادیه اروپا بر استراتژی جو شرکت : مقایسه شرکت خمیر و کاغذ سوئد و نروژ
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|19818||2013||10 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Energy Policy, Volume 56, May 2013, Pages 516–525
This article examines to what extent and how the EU ETS has influenced the climate strategies of two Nordic pulp and paper companies: Swedish SCA and Norwegian Norske Skog. Rising electricity prices are perceived to be the greatest effect of the scheme. The EU ETS has served to reinforce commitments to improve energy efficiency and reduce CO2 emissions in both companies studied. Procedures like monitoring of CO2 emissions and accounting for CO2 prices have become more significant since the introduction of the EU ETS, but the scheme has not triggered a search for innovative, low-carbon solutions. Due to differences in market factors and production factors, SCA has been more active than Norske Skog in investing in and implementing CO2-lean actions. Future studies of climate-mitigation activities, strategies and innovations in the pulp and paper industry should involve more in-depth investigation of the interactions between such factors and the EU ETS.
The EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) was the first international policy instrument to introduce regulation of fossil CO2 emissions of pulp and paper companies in Europe. Of 11,500 installations introduced to the system, about 900 were pulp and paper mills. In terms of allocated EU Emission Allowances (EUAs) the pulp and paper industry (hereafter PPI) represents two per cent of EU ETS (Hyvärinen, 2005: 40). Can the ETS induce companies in the PPI and other energy-intensive industries to adopt proactive climate strategies? That will represent a crucial test of the EU’s ability to achieve a low-carbon economy. Further, how can divergent corporate climate strategies be explained? Examination of this question can shed light on the conditions under which different corporate climate strategies emerge. This article examines to what extent and how the ETS has influenced the climate strategies of two specific pulp and paper companies and the European PPI more generally. One of the few works on this topic is Rogge et al. (2011), whose study, based on survey data of paper producers and technology providers in Germany, found their innovation activities to be governed mainly by market factors, not the EU ETS or other climate policies. As the EU ETS is the first EU-wide regulation to target PPI CO2 emissions, we were puzzled by the finding that the scheme apparently had scant effect on innovation activities, and suspected that the methodological approach of Rogge et al. had bypassed important aspects of corporate responses to the ETS. Complementary interview-based studies with relevant company representatives can identify more nuanced perceptions about corporate climate strategies, including the possible influence of the EU ETS on innovation activities. This has motivated our approach to examining the effect of the EU ETS by analysing the status and changes in climate strategies in two comparable yet different pulp and paper manufacturing companies: Svenska Cellulosa Aktiebolaget (SCA) and Norske Skog, with headquarters in Sweden and in Norway, respectively. Both companies appear to have progressive climate strategies, having been ranked as the best Swedish and the best Norwegian company in the 2010 Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) appraisal. The two companies display some variation in climate strategies and development over time, with SCA apparently experimenting more with innovative abatement projects than Norske Skog. Further, Norske Skog specializes in newsprint production, and is smaller and less diversified than SCA. Due to the market situation with surplus production capacity of newsprint, Norske Skog has recently sold assets to reduce debts, and has shut down several mills to cut costs (Norske Skog, 2011).1 By contrast, SCA develops, produces and markets a broad portfolio of products and ranks among the world’s leading forest industry companies. This variation in company type and performance enables exploration of the conditions under which different corporate climate strategies may emerge. This article proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the analytical framework and methodology applied in this study. Section 3 examines the corporate climate strategies of SCA and Norske Skog in presence of EU ETS. In Section 4 we analyse the link between the EU ETS and the changes in corporate climate strategies in light of three causal mechanisms that shed light on corporate responses to regulation. Section 5 explains the divergence in corporate climate strategies of SCA and Norske Skog. In the final Section 6, we identify some patterns in the complex process of EU ETS adaptation in the two companies and reflect on the future outlook of EU emissions trading and the PPI.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
The EU ETS was the first mandatory climate regulation targeting the PPI in Europe. The PPI sector initially opposed the ETS, arguing it would entail competitive disadvantages for European industry. The rational-calculative model of corporate behaviour captures well the opposition to the EU ETS in the PPI and the short-term, cost-minimizing adaptation to the EU ETS by European pulp and paper companies. The pulp and paper industry generally appears to focus on continuous improvements in operations and reductions in energy use, rather than long-term, innovative solutions. Corroborating this observation, our study has shown that emissions trading had a rather limited effect on the climate strategies of SCA and Norske Skog. For both firms, company-wide CO2 emission objectives existed prior to the introduction of the scheme, as did systems for site-specific emissions monitoring. The value of CO2 emissions is recognized and accounted for by SCA and Norske Skog, but the EUA price-tag is a minor incentive among the many factors that underpin industrial investment decisions. However, the observation that SCA and to some extent Norske Skog have engaged in low-carbon activities for the longer term does not fit with the model of cost-minimizing, short-term adaptation to the EU ETS. By influencing electricity prices, the scheme has reinforced commitments to improve energy efficiency and reduce CO2 emissions. Indeed, rising electricity prices are perceived as the strongest influence of the EU ETS and have led to strategic decisions to investigate the alternatives to the wholesale electricity market. Electricity-intensive pulp and paper companies are showing greater interest in investing in power assets, on their own or in various constellations; in making bilateral agreements for long-term power contracts; and engaging in energy-supply contracts. Compared to Norske Skog, SCA appears more attuned to exploring new opportunities. One explanation is company variation in factors of production that constrain or facilitate specific innovative and CO2-lean investment solutions. Illustrative is SCA’s extended search for new biomass-based energy solutions to reduce emissions. The situation for Norske Skog is different, as the company has less need for CO2-lean innovation for its mills in Norway, which receive the bulk of their electricity needs from hydropower. Two additional factors seem to explain the greater willingness of SCA than Norske Skog to invest in low-carbon solutions: availability of human and financial resources, and dynamic capabilities. SCA is not only a far bigger company than Norske Skog; it is also one of Europe’s largest owners of forests that can be used for innovation and emissions-reduction purposes. SCA also has a long history of product and process innovation and ranks among the top three innovators in the industry. We must conclude, however, that the EU ETS so far has had little effect in triggering the search for innovative, low-carbon solutions. Even a frontrunner like SCA has maintained a low profile with regard to possible long-term abatement technologies like black liquor gasification and CCS. Hence, our study does not lend support to the Porter Hypothesis–i.e., that the EU ETS would alert and educate companies to the benefits of reducing emissions, and raise the likelihood of product and process innovations achieving high environmental performance. In our analysis, the limited effect of the EU ETS on innovation emerges as due primarily to surplus of allowances and a low EUA price. Finally, the proposition that companies may internalize norms and rules about appropriate conduct through their participation in the EU ETS receives limited support in our study. Both SCA and Norske Skog had recognized their responsibility in mitigating GHG emissions before the introduction of the ETS. Moreover, their actions do not appear to be norm-driven but seem motivated primarily by economic motives, taking their social responsibility into account. As part of the EU 2020 strategy there are high expectations for the EU ETS to become the key policy instrument in delivering cost-effective climate mitigation in energy-intensive industries. The cap for 2020 represents a 21% reduction of emissions compared to 2005, when the EU ETS was first implemented. Thereby the EU ETS, alongside with the effort-sharing decision, is intended to ensure that the EU meets its binding target of 20% reductions of GHG emissions by 2020 compared to 1990. However, this does not imply that EUA prices will be sufficiently high to directly stimulate investments, climate strategies and innovations in the trading sector and more specifically in the PPI. Estimates based on EUA futures indicate that EUA prices will remain low throughout the third period. Although price projections are uncertain, the economic downturn combined with generous allocations during the second trading period is set to create a surplus of EUAs which can be transferred to the third period. Thus, it is possible that access to EUAs will be inflated compared to actual emission levels of the PPI–which would lessen the need for companies to purchase any EUAs over the initial years of the third period, and further delay investment in innovative strategies to reduce GHG emissions. For the system to have greater influence on company investment decisions in the future, the enforcement of a stringent cap and a high EUA market price will be necessary.