ارزیابی اثرات اقتصادی از دید پس از کیوتو ترکیه بر انتشار تجارت
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|19824||2013||11 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Energy Policy, Volume 60, September 2013, Pages 764–774
For the post-Kyoto period, Turkey strongly emphasizes the establishment of national emission trading system by 2015 and its integration with the EU ETS along its accession process to the EU. In this paper, we study the mechanisms of adjustment and economic welfare consequences of various ETS regimes that Turkey considers to apply by 2020, i.e. regional ETS and international trading within the EU ETS. We conduct our analysis under the current EU 20–20–20 emission target, 20%, and also under its revised version, 30%. We find that Turkey has economic gains from linking with the EU ETS under the 20% cap, in comparison to the domestic ETSs. Despite the EU's welfare loss under linkage in comparison to the case where Turkey has domestic abatement efforts, it still prefers linking as it increases economic well being compared to the case where Turkey does not abate. Under 30% cutback, Turkey has critical output loss under linkage due to high abatement burden on the EU, while the EU is better off as it passes some of its abatement burden to Turkey. Therefore, emission quotas and their allocation across the ETS and non ETS sectors become highly critical in distributing the overall economic gains from bilateral trading.
Following its removal from the Kyoto Protocol's Annex B list, Turkey did not follow any official emission reduction targets over the period, 2008 and 2012. For the post-Kyoto period, the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization (MEU) delivered Turkey's national vision within the scope of climate change in the National Climate Change Action Plan: 2011–2023 (Ministry of Environment and Urbanization, 2011). Within this document, Turkey's objectives are stated as becoming a country fully integrating climate change related objectives into its development policies, improving energy efficiency, increasing the use of renewable energy sources, and decreasing its emissions. In stabilizing CO2 emissions, the Action Plan strongly emphasizes the establishment of national emission trading system in Turkey by 2015 and its integration with the existing and new global and regional carbon markets. Turkey has also showed its determination in participating in global carbon markets with the opening of the Environment Chapter as part of the EU enlargement process. Turkey is expected to integrate with the EU ETS along its accession process to join the EU. Besides setting the international political agenda, as being world's largest international carbon market, the EU ETS provides a natural venue for Turkey in establishing its national permit market and a potential partner for international carbon trading. Having started in 2005 with a trial period, the EU ETS completed its second phase during 2008–2012, and is at the onset of its third phase between 2013 and 2020, compatible with the EU 20–20–20 targets (European Commission, 2008). For the post-Kyoto period, the EU strongly supports an effective global carbon market and encourages establishing direct links between the EU ETS and other cap-and-trade systems. The third countries neighboring the EU, together with the candidate and potential candidate countries, are stated as the most potential trading partners (European Commission, 2009). Bottom-up linking of cap-and-trade schemes are highly desirable as it enhances price equalization across the linked schemes resulting in reduced aggregate abatement costs compared to ex ante abatement costs ( Haites, 2001 and Blyth and Bosi, 2003). In addition, both Turkey and the EU are supposed to benefit from the proper functioning of the carbon market due to increased liquidity and decreased price volatility ( Baron and Bygrave, 2002). Nevertheless, overall efficiency gains do not necessarily translate into regional efficiency gains. Linking the EU ETS with the Turkish national permit market can have various distributional impacts, which strongly depend upon the design of permit trading scheme, existing distortions in the economies, carbon intensity of the economies, and further on the terms of trade effects that the regions are exposed to via international trade. Therefore, the regional efficiency gains should be analyzed in a way that accounts for these various price and income effects. Despite incentives provided in the political background, there remain many challenges that both Turkey and the European Union face in formalizing their post-2012 abatement strategies based on permit trading. Previous modeling efforts on the Turkish abatement strategies against greenhouse gas emissions have exclusively focused on applications of taxation in the Turkish economy in isolation from the global economy. Telli et al. (2008) and Vural (2009) concentrated on the taxation of energy use as instruments of carbon dioxide abatement while Kumbaroglu (2003) focused on the taxation of sulfur emissions. In a more recent study by Aydin and Acar (2010), the economic impacts of unilateral carbon taxation in Turkey are investigated under the case of Turkey's accession to the European Union. The economic aspects of bottom up linking of the EU ETS with other cap-and-trade systems have been assessed in various model frameworks. In their theoretical study, Eyckmans and Hagem (2011) show that the EU countries can benefit from the bottom up linking of regional cap-and-trade systems in case of certain trade agreements. They test their hypotheses in using numerical simulation methods across EU and China for 2015. In another study, Anger (2008) studies linking the EU-ETS with the newly emerging market schemes beyond Europe, i.e. Japan, Canada, the US and the OECD Pacific countries. Their numerical analysis shows that linking the EU-ETS with the emerging permit markets induces minor economic benefits for the EU, while the economic impacts for the non-EU countries can vary depending on the nature of domestic structural differences and prevalent inefficiencies. The dependence of the economic impacts to the structure of allowance allocation in the linking permit trading schemes is further analyzed in Anger (2009). Thus, there is a gap in the previous literature in addressing the economic impacts of Turkey's abatement policies and bottom-up linking of the EU ETS with the emerging Turkish permit market during the post-Kyoto period. This paper aims to fill this gap and analyze the unilateral use of emission trading schemes in Turkey as part of its contribution to the international climate change mitigation efforts. It further investigates the economic impacts of linkage provisions on both the EU and Turkey, which is planned to take place as part of the EU's enlargement policies in the post-2012 period. To this end, we build a multi-regional, multi-sectoral applied general equilibrium model in order to study the economic impact of Turkey's market-based abatement policies on the respective economies. Our analysis shows that the EU prefers that Turkey abates at home rather than not, while Turkey finds domestic abatement costly. However, Turkey can alleviate some of these costs by bilateral trading within the EU ETS. The economic gains out of permit trading are highly dependent on the total emission targets and their allocation across sectors. Our analysis further suggests that in the case of an increase in the EU's emission target, Turkey would not prefer to trade permits with the EU but rather stick to domestic abatement policies. Under 20% cutback, Turkey has economic gains under bilateral trading within the EU ETS in comparison to unilateral trading schemes. Although the EU has certain level of welfare loss under bilateral trading in comparison to the case where Turkey has domestic abatement efforts, it still prefers bilateral trading as it increases economic well being compared to the case where Turkey does not abate. However, under 30% cutback, Turkey has critical output losses under bilateral trading due to high abatement burden on the EU. On the other hand, the EU favors bilateral trading as it passes some of its abatement burden to Turkey. The following pages of the paper are organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide key environmental and economic data to portray Turkey's standing in comparison to the EU countries. In Section 3, the model structure and calibration strategy are laid out, together with the forward calibration procedure used in comparative static analysis. In Section 4, we describe the scenario runs and discuss the computational results. Section 5 summarizes our findings and concludes.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
In this paper we utilized a multi-regional, multi-sectoral applied general equilibrium model to study the economic impacts of Turkey ' s permit trading applications and to further investigate the impacts under international cooperation with the EU, via the EU ETS. Our counterfactual scenarios mainly focus on the effects of various emission cutback requirements, the importance of market segmentation in implementing these targets and, fi nally, the effects of pursuing cooperation with the EU in carbon trading. These scenarios are simulated for 2020 under the current EU 20 – 20 – 20 emission targets and also under the revised targets. It should be noted that the numerical results from this comparative static framework disregards the improvements in renewable technology use and the use of offset credits in the permit markets. Hence, the results should be interpreted accordingly. In our numerical analysis, we fi nd that Turkey suffers from welfare losses in case of domestic abatement policies and these losses tend to decrease when the EU applies a higher emission reduction target of 30%. From the EU ' s perspective, Turkey ' s engagement in domestic abatement activities is always preferable as it enables the EU welfare gains compared to the case where the EU continues to apply its abatement actions without any interna- tional cooperation. As Turkey sets higher cutback ratios, the EU ' s welfare gain gradually increases, due to increased competitiveness of the European industries in the world markets. Turkey is expected to suffer ef fi ciency losses from market segmentation more as the emission target increases. This is mainly due to increasing price differential between marginal abatement costs of sectors belonging to different market segments. Hence, total compliance cost of meeting the same amount of cap increases. The EU ' s welfare gains from Turkey ' s abatement actions also diminish when market segmentation exists. This is a direct effect of increasing marginal abatement costs of some of the European industries due to trade linkages. Our results indicate that the incentives for Turkey to participate in the EU ETS depend quite much on the EU ' s total emission target. Under the current EU 20 – 20 – 20 emission targets, Turkey will unambiguously gain in comparison to its domestic abatement actions. Since Turkey becomes a permit importer in the EU ETS market, some of its abatement cost burden is carried by the EU. As a result, Turkey experiences expansion in its energy and energy intensive sectors that are integrated with the European carbon market. Depressed marginal abatement costs of energy and energyintensive sectors have positive spillover effects on other non energy sectors via cheaper energy prices, as well. Therefore, Turkey becomes better off under international cooperation. On the other hand, if the EU increases its emission target to 30%, Turkey experiences that participating in the EU ETS is more welfare decreasing compared to the comprehensive and segmen- ted ETSs. The composition of buyers and sellers in the EU ETS is now changed, and the EU becomes a permit importer for low levels of Turkey ' s emission reduction target. Thus, Turkey has output losses on the one hand, and auctioning revenues on the other, being dominated by the former effect. As Turkey increases its target to 20%, the EU initiates exporting permits to Turkey. However, the improving effect of this change on Turkey ' s welfare is quite minor and is dominated by the increasing cost burden on the Turkish non-ETS sectors. As our analysis further reveals, the European Union has welfare gains out of Turkey ' s domestic mitigation actions due to increased competitiveness of its industries in the world markets. Under the current EU 20 – 20 – 20 emission targets, the EU loses some of these welfare gains when Turkey integrates with the EU ETS. As opposed to this, under the revised EU 20 – 20 – 20 targets, the EU fi nds it more welfare improving that Turkey ' s regional ETS integrates with the EU ETS. In comparison to the current situation where Turkey has not yet taken any abatement action, the EU unambiguously favors that the Turkish ETS links with the EU ETS and the volume of the permit market enlarges. The magnitude of net gains from linkage highly depends on the structural parameters of Turkey ' s permit trading scheme, i.e. the level of the emission target and its distribution across the sectors. As our analysis reveals, the EU ends up with less welfare gains from linkage as Turkey ' s mitigation target increases. Hence, the question of how much burden that the Turkish authorities will put on the ETS sectors is highly critical and is open to a controversial public debate.