اثرات نامتقارن تجارب گذشته ی نام های تجاری (برند) مد لوکس واقعی و تقلبی آنها بر قصد خرید هر کدام
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|1995||2012||9 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||8195 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of Business Research, Volume 65, Issue 10, October 2012, Pages 1507–1515
As counterfeiting activity continues to thrive around the world, marketers of fashion luxury brands work hard to discourage counterfeiting and to protect their revenues. This research evaluates the business risk related to fashion counterfeit consumption behavior by examining the effect of past experiences with counterfeit luxury brands (CLBs) and genuine luxury brands (GLBs). Based on survey data from five designer fashion product categories, Study 1 finds an asymmetrical effect that past experiences with GLBs are negatively related to purchase intention of CLBs, whereas past experiences with CLBs do not relate to purchase intention of GLBs. Study 2, based on experimental data from two luxury handbag brands with realistic price information, confirms the results of Study 1. This study also discusses research and managerial implications.
McCarthy (2004) defines counterfeiting, or “manufacturing knockoff,” as “the act of producing or selling a product containing an intentional and calculated reproduction of a genuine trademark. A counterfeit mark is identical to or substantially indistinguishable from a genuine mark.” Counterfeiting activity is estimated to account for 5 to 7% of world trade, depriving genuine manufacturers of about $600 billion a year, with a growth rate of 1700% over the past 10 years (Economist, 2010). As for luxury fashion brand counterfeiting, in the U.K., more than 64% of the U.K. Customs seizure cases were luxury brands (The Financial Times, 2005). U.S. Customs and Border Protection also reports luxury brands as a major object of counterfeiting, seizing about $273 million in 2008, a 39% hike in value from the previous year (Casabona, 2009). Counterfeit luxury brands are so prevalent that the U.S. Congress advocates the Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act, which extends copyright protection to fashion brands and works for the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement with eleven countries that represent the major counterfeiting victims and offenders (The U.S. Congress, 2010). Counterfeits create enamor problems for the global society. First of all, they pose a serious threat to legitimate businesses by undermining innovation, which is a key component of corporate revenues and national economic growth (Wilke & Zaichkowsky, 1999). The U.S. Customs and Border Protection blame counterfeit merchandise for the loss of more than 750,000 American jobs as well as the loss of tax revenues (Meyers, 2008). Criminal investigations also find that counterfeits serve as a major means of supplying funds to terrorist organizations, including Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the group accused of the Madrid train bombings in 2004 (International Herald Tribune, 2007 and Ungoed-Thomas, 2005). Consequently, manufacturers, distributors, researchers, and policy makers pay a great deal of attention to developing strategies that discourage counterfeiting to protect the victims of counterfeiting. They propose and implement various anti-counterfeiting measures, including diligent legal litigation (Economist, 2010). Nevertheless, counterfeiting continues to thrive around the world because of the growing demand worldwide for well-known luxury brands, lack of consumer and counterfeiter morality, production and distribution capabilities in less developed countries, inadequate penalties for counterfeiters, and technological advances enabling counterfeiting activities (Chaudhry, 2006, Green and Smith, 2002, Lee and Yoo, 2009, Olsen and Granzin, 1993 and Wee et al., 1995). While marketers of genuine luxury brands (hereafter called GLBs) struggle with their corresponding counterfeit luxury brands (hereafter called CLBs), ironically, in the software industry, counterfeits are known to benefit original brands. For example, Conner and Rumelt (1991) find that software piracy increases the number of program users; consequently, manufacturers object to software protection. Givon, Mahajan, and Muller (1995) also find that the sales of genuine word processors and spreadsheets in the U.K. significantly increase because of active word-of-mouth resulting from pirated items. Slive and Bernhardt (1998) insist that software manufacturers maximize their profit by tolerating piracy. Maltz and Chiappetta (2002) oppose eliminating software pirates because they can help firms identify useful innovative technologies. Haruvy, Mahajan, and Prasad (2004) demonstrate with real market data that piracy aids a full and fast market penetration of software. The photocopying of journal articles by users (Liebowitz, 1985) as well as illegal music file sharing (Peitz & Waelbroeck, 2006) also has similar findings. An important question that arises is whether, as observed in pirated software, inferior products (CLBs in our research) benefit quality products (GLBs) (McGinnis & Gentry, 2009). Obviously, marketers of GLBs must not agree, but little research has investigated the effect of CLBs on GLBs and vice versa. Therefore, the purpose of this research is to examine the effect of past experiences with CLBs (GLBs) on the purchase intent for GLBs (CLBs). The result will be a major contribution of this study to the literature. In the study, we narrowly define counterfeit consumers as consumers who are not deceived by counterfeiters, but knowingly purchase and consume CLBs. In fact, such nondeceived consumers of CLBs comprise the majority of such consumers; they are well aware of unlawful retail outlets selling CLBs, and such sellers also explicitly inform consumers that they are selling CLBs ( Gentry et al., 2001 and Grossman and Shapiro, 1988). In the following sections, we summarize the current research trend on CLBs, develop research hypotheses, and conduct two studies to test the hypotheses across luxury fashion product categories. Finally, we discuss the managerial and research implications of the findings.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
Study 1 and Study 2, confirming the hypotheses, include four major findings. First, past behavior of GLBs is a strong predictor of future behavioral intention toward GLBs. Second, past behavior of CLBs is a strong predictor of future behavioral intention toward CLBs. CLB consumers show a strong purchase intent for CLBs even when not given the advantageous price of CLBs and the intimidating price of GLBs. Third, GLB consumers show negative intention to buy CLBs, not developing an interest in CLBs at all, even when the advantageous price information of CLBs is available. The more often they experience GLBs, the less likely consumers purchase CLBs. Fourth, CLB consumption experiences are not related to intention to buy GLBs. This result cautiously implies that CLB consumers might not steal the sales of GLBs because however many of CLBs they have purchased before do not decrease the desire to buy GLBs, and that past experiences with CLBs are simply irrelevant to GLB purchases in the future. This result is consistent with Nia and Zaichkowsky (2000) in that CLBs do not decrease the demand for GLBs and that the value, satisfaction, and status of GLBs do not diminish as a result of the availability of CLBs. Study 2 (experimental design) produced the very same result as Study 1 (cross-sectional survey). In Study 2 price information was provided for both GLBs and CLBs, but the negative relationship between past experiences with GLBs and purchase intention of CLBs was maintained, meaning that GLB buyers were not tempted at all by cheap CLB prices. At the same time, the study found no relationship between past experiences with CLBs and purchase intention of GLBs, which means that CLB consumers were not intimidated by the expensive GLB prices. As a result, they did not develop hostile behavioral intention against GLBs. The price disadvantage of GLBs as well as the price advantage of CLBs did not make CLB buyers develop a dislike for GLBs or make GLB buyers develop a love for CLBs. However, as Table 1 reports, the GLB (CLB) price matters only when a consumer buys the GLB (CLB), not the other. In summary, buying a GLB (CLB) is affected by its own price level, but not by the alternative's, that is, the CLB's (GLB's) price. 4.1. Managerial and policy implications Counterfeit consumer behavior is very important to luxury fashion brand manufacturers, distributors, and policy makers (e.g., Lee & Yoo, 2009). The purpose of this research was to examine exactly how past experiences with CLBs is related to the purchase intention of GLBs and vice versa. This research shows that the answer depends on two factors: past behavior and product price. If a consumer has bought more CLBs than GLBs in the past, the consumer is more likely to buy CLBs. On the other hand, if a consumer has bought more GLBs than CLBs, the consumer does not mind the price gap between the GLB and its counterfeit version and is highly likely to choose the GLB over the CLB. Based on those findings, strategists should consider implementing the following managerial ideas to increase purchase intent for luxury fashion brands in the midst of the thriving counterfeiting phenomenon. First, the current study finds that CLB consumers develop a strong intention to buy CLBs. Therefore, consumers should be discouraged not to develop such behaviors. For that purpose, for example, consider promoting consumers' perceived risks of buying and consuming CLBs. As consumers buy luxury fashion brands to satisfy a desire for social and financial status, recognition, and superiority, they would reject CLBs, believing they could be embarrassed socially in front of others (Ha and Lennon, 2006, Nia and Zaichkowsky, 2000, Penz and Stöttinger, 2005 and Wilcox et al., 2009). Appealing to the law to maximize the social risk of CLB consumption may be one of the best methods (Prendergast et al., 2002) of eliminating CLBs. Appealing to the law would be very effective in coercively constraining consumers' habitual practice of buying CLBs since they rely on past behavior without much consideration of cognitive and rational evaluations to control the behavior (Yoo & Lee, 2009). Unfortunately, in luxury brand counterfeiting, copyright laws punish mainly the supply side of it, such as creators, manufacturers, distributors, dealers, and sellers (e.g., Colchester, 2010), but rarely the demand side, such as buyers and owners (Lee & Yoo, 2009). However, Penz and Stöttinger (2005) find that the fewer the obstacles to purchase CLBs, the higher the intention to purchase them. This suggests that a legal action against CLB consumption would create huge concern in the consumer's mind. Harvey and Wallas (2003) find through an experiment that consumers would not buy CLBs if they had a high chance of being detected and prosecuted by law enforcement authorities for purchasing them. Accordingly, they call for more stringent enforcement of anti-counterfeiting legislation penalizing individual buyers. From this perspective, the fact that fashion counterfeits are often implicated in terrorist activities should be used for a development of anti-counterfeit law against individual CLB consumers (e.g., Johnson, 2010). Actively promoting the fact that money could possibly go to funding terrorist organizations would help to curb the appeal of counterfeit products (International Herald Tribune, 2007). Bringing CLB consumers to court is not feasible, yet under current laws, diligent investigation and prosecution of copyright law violators among CLB suppliers could work as a very effective tool to educate consumers that CLBs are illicit products and buying them is a socially undesirable behavior (Albers-Miller, 1999). Second, as the high price of GLBs significantly discourages the intention to buy GLBs, the value of GLBs should be enhanced. For example, the styles and designs of GLBs need to last for a reasonable length of time to make spending money on GLBs seem to be worthwhile. Although fashion, style, and popularity are important characteristics of luxury brands, fast and radical changes of the design would encourage consumers to buy CLBs to live up with fast-changing designs, which decrease the financial value of existing GLBs. But when the design or major theme fades slowly enough, the expensive price of the GLB would pay off as the consumer can use the product for a long time. Even when a change of the design should be made, key patterns by which consumers recognize the brand from others must remain unchanged to minimize social embarrassment that might occur from wearing out-dated designs. Third, as the price advantage of CLBs is not a determinant of GLB purchases, in order to make consumers switch from CLBs to GLBs, fashion marketers should convince counterfeit consumers that non-economic benefits of GLBs overwhelmingly outweigh those of CLBs. For example, not only brand name but also other brand benefits such as durability of the brand, warranty, refund, and post-purchase services should be communicated to consumers because a counterfeiter can easily copy the brand name but not other brand attributes. Such educational communication will help consumers to balance the expensive price of a GLB with the lower price of a CLB. At the same time, consumer education should also emphasize the negative consequences of CLBs on legitimate businesses, conveying the sentiment of fashion marketers. For example, Santo Versace, president of Altagamma and Versace, remarked (Euronews, 2010), “If you purchase a counterfeit product, first of all you're supporting the black economy and in practice, tax evasion as well as child labor and the financing of organized crime. So if you buy a fake article I think that you'll be ashamed of yourself.” Fourth, fashion marketers of luxury brands can make new GLB items delivered faster by using designated online shopping sites (O'Connell, 2010). Such a fast move would make the manufacturing and delivery of counterfeits much slower than that of GLBs, and the designated online sites will guarantee the purchase of authentic products. A lot of online shopping sites such as eBay have made buying and selling CLBs much easier. Sales of CLBs via the internet are estimated to reach $135 billion in 2010 and are likely to increase (Economist, 2010). Fifth, this study finds that once consumers own and use GLBs, they are very likely to become loyal consumers to GLBs. For that purpose, affordable versions of GLBs can be an effective tool to attract CLB consumers. They may function as a bridge in aiding consumers to adopt GLBs quickly and permanently. Of course, however, the strategy of less expensive products could engender an erosion of the brand's reputation and could cannibalize revenues of the more expensive versions of the brand. In a worse scenario, the affordable versions could be perceived as semi-counterfeits, diluting the brand equity. To avoid such problems, lower priced GLBs need to distinguish themselves from high-end GLBs. One practical idea is to target young consumers such as teens and preteens with designs that are more affordable in price and more youthful in design. 4.2. Research implications The study here examines the impact of past behavior on the purchase intention of GLBs and CLBs. Although purchase intention is strongly linked to actual purchase, future research needs to examine purchase behavior directly. One idea is to use a choice task in which consumers are asked to make a purchase choice between a GLB and its counterfeit version. Such a choice task may create a more realistic situation for consumers in which they are allowed to buy only one item, real or fake. And the task would be able to examine dynamic choice behaviors between GLBs and CLBs under a variety of experimental settings. In Study 2, brand name, income, and price strongly influence the buying intention of CLBs and GLBs. Future research needs to investigate the role of each in more detail. In addition, future research needs to identify other factors that influence CLB purchases. Suspected but under-researched factors include personal factors, environmental factors, and product and marketing factors. Research will reveal which factors drive consumers to select CLBs over GLBs and vice versa. From such studies, managers and policy makers will be able to formulate more effective measures against CLB consumption behaviors. Most studies focus on individual differences in explaining consumer behavior related to CLBs, but future research also needs to examine cultural differences. For example, consumers in a collectivist culture, being more afraid of social disapproval, might not want to reveal that their products are in fact fakes, whereas consumers in an individualist culture, in which individual decisions are respected, might boast to friends about consuming quality fakes for a much lower price. But an understanding of how cultural environments of the society and individuals' cultural values motivate consumers to purchase CLBs remains largely unknown (e.g., Yoo, Donthu and Lenartowicz, 2011 and Yoo, Lee and Jung, 2011). The current study relies on self-reports, but consumers are likely to underreport the consumption of illicit products. Such social desirability bias, a major threat to the validity of research, is often found among those who are older, more educated, employed, and living with their own family (Kim, Hill, & Martha, 2003). As our sample was female college students, they did not fit the profile of those susceptible to the bias. Nevertheless, future research needs to take into consideration how to detect and eliminate the bias. Further longitudinal studies need to be conducted to examine how individual consumers develop more responsible consumption behaviors against CLBs over time, for example, as they get older or earn a different level of income. Likewise, how and why consumers switch between CLBs and GLBs needs to be studied, which will shed more insights into effective anti-counterfeiting strategies. Finally, future research needs to determine whether or not the results of this study hold in countries where economic conditions and anti-counterfeiting regulations are quite different and whether they hold equally for domestic versus foreign luxury brands (Granzin & Olsen, 1998).